Loyola University Chicago

Loyola eCommons
Dissertations

Theses and Dissertations

1977

Machiavellianism, Perspective Taking, and Partner's Response as
Predictors of Interpersonal Behavior Measured by a Modified
Prisoner's Dilemma Game
Willaim Bryant
Loyola University Chicago

Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss
Part of the Psychology Commons

Recommended Citation
Bryant, Willaim, "Machiavellianism, Perspective Taking, and Partner's Response as Predictors of
Interpersonal Behavior Measured by a Modified Prisoner's Dilemma Game" (1977). Dissertations. 1577.
https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss/1577

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more
information, please contact ecommons@luc.edu.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.
Copyright © 1977 Willaim Bryant

MACHIAVELLIANISM, PERSPECTIVE TAKING, AND PARTNER'S
RESPONSE AS PREDICTORS OF INTERPERSONAL BEHAVIOR
MEASURED BY A MODIFIED PRISONER'S DILEMMA GAME

by
William P. Bryant

A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of Loyola University of Chicago in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosphy
December
1977

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to thank my committee, Ors. Jeanne Fo1ey,
James E. Johnson, and Thomas P. Petzel for their help and encouragement in my struggles with this study.

I would also like

to thank Sr. Carlene, Principal of St. Henry's School, and
Sr. Mary Ann, Principal of St. Hilary's School, as well as the
children who participated in this study and their parents.
Special thanks go to Mary Feczko, who generously allowed me to
use some of the measures she herself developed.

There are at

least a dozen other friends and colleagues who have helped at
various stages of the project.

My thanks to them.

ii

VITA
The author, Wi 11 i am P. Bryant, was born September 26,
1940, in Buffalo, New York.

He received his primary and secondary education in the
public schools of Arlington, Virginia, where he graduated from
Wakefield High School in 1958.

He entered Dartmouth College,

Hanover, New Hampshire, in 1958 and graduated with a B.A.
in anthropology (with honors) in June, 1963, having spent his
junior year and a year's leave of absence at the University
of Munich.

He attended the University of Chicago from 1963

through 1966, receiving a M.A. in social anthropology in
September, 1966.
From 1966 through 1971, he taught anthropology and social
science at Roosevelt University and Loop College in Chicago.
In 1971, he entered the clinical psychology at Loyola
University of Chicago, where he received an M.A. in psychology
in June, 1975.

In the summer of 1972, he did a clerkship

at Pritzker Children's Hospital in Chicago, and from 1973 to
1975, he did an internship at the V.A. hospital in Hines, Ill.

Currently he is Staff Psychologist at the Southlake
Community Mental Health Center, Inc. in Merrillville, Indiana.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
VITA

ii

. . . . .

iii

LIST OF TABLES

v

CONTENTS OF APPENDIX

vii

Chapter
I.

PURPOSE AND REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE .

1

Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . • .
Review of the Literature . . . • . . . . . .
Social Cognition and Perspective Taking
Machiavellianism . . . • . . . . . . .
The Prisoner'$ Dilemma Game and Interpersonal Behavior Styles
Hypotheses
II.

1
3

3
12
22

27

METHOD . . .

29

Subjects
Materials .
Procedure .
II I.

29
32
39

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION . .
Machiavellianism, Role Taking, and Empathy .
Role Taking, Empathy, and the Prisoner's
Dilemma Game . . . . . . . . . . • . • . .
Machiavellianism, Partner, and the
Prisoner's Dilemma Game . . . .

IV.

CONCLUDING COMMENTS

49
50
~

58

66
79

SUMMARY .

83

REFERENCE NOTES .

86

REFERENCES

87

APPENDIX A

93

iv

LIST OF TABLES
Table
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.
10.

11.

12.

Page
Means and Standard Deviations for Age and
Social Class of Subjects for Sex, Partner, and
Machiavellianism

31

Correlations among Measures of Interpersonal
Competence and Variables of the Prisoner's
Dilemma Game

51

Means and Standard Deviations for the Role
Taking Task in Relation to Difference Levels
of Machiavellianism and Empathy

53

Analysis of Variance for the Role Taking Task
in Relation to Different Levels of Machiavellianism
and Empathy

54

Means and Standard Deviations for the Empathy
Questionnaire in Relation to Different Levels
of Machiavellianism and Role Taking

56

Analysis of Variance for the Empathy Questionnaire
in Relation to Difference Levels of Machiavellianism and Role Taking

57

Means and Standard Deviations for Total Score,
Judgment, and SumX in Relation to Partner, Role
Taking and Empathy

59

Analysis of Variance for Unequal ~: Total Score,
Judgment, and SumX for Prisoner's Dilemma in
Relation to Role Taking, Empathy, and Interactions

61

Means and Standard Deviations for Altruism in
Relation to Role Taking, Empathy, and Partner

64

Analysis of Variance for Unequal N_: Altruism
in Relation to Role Taking, Empathy, and Interactions

65

Means and Standard Deviations for Total Judgment,
and Score, SumX in Relation to Partner, Sex, and
Mach

68

Analysis of Variance for Equal N: Total Score,
Judgment, and SumX in Relation to Partners Sex,
and Machiavellianism

69

v

Page
13.

14.
15.

16.
17.

Means and Standard Deviations for Variables of
Change and Difference for the Prisoner's Dilemma
Game

70

Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance for Change
and Difference

72

Means and Standard Deviations for Altruism
in Relation to Partner, Sex, and Machiavellianism

73

Analysis of Variance for Equal N: Altruism in
Relation to Partner, Sex, and Machiavellianism

74

Individual Comparisons among Means for Different
Levels of Partner Using the Newman-Keuls
Procedure Evaluated Against Duncan's Critical
Values

vi

75

CONTENTS FOR APPENDIX A
Page
I.

Parental Consent Form

94

I I.

Empathy Questionnaire

96

III.

Scoring Guide, Empathy Questionnaire

99

IV.

Kiddie Mach Test

102

v.

The X-Y Game (Prisoner's Dilemma Game)

105

vii

CHAPTER I
PURPOSE AND REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Purpose
An interest in the components of interpersonal competence,
prerequisites 1 for effective social interaction, dates back at
least to the work of Thorndike (1920), Piaget (1926), and
Mead (1934); however, studies with this focus have burgeoned
to such an extent in the last decade that several review
articles have been written in an attempt to define and synthesize this complicated, amorphous field:

see, for example,

books and reviews by Christie and Geis (1970), Deutsch and
Madle (1975), Hoffman (1977), Shantz (1975), and Walker and.
Foley (1974).

Although much of this work has focused on social

cognition, including role taking and empathy, other concepts,
such as Machiavellianism, have received attention.

Indeed,

high role-taking or empathetic ability and a Machiavellian
orientation to interpersonal relations have been considered
two of the components of interpersonal competence by Anderson
and Mess1ck (1974), 0 Malley (1977), and Smith (1968).
1

In an article coinciding with the upsurge of interest
in interpersonal competence, Weinstein (1969) suggested relation1With the exception of partner, the independent variables in the present study are subject variables. Therefore, the relationships are correlational, not causal.
At certain points in the study, it has been useful to use
terminology which might seem to imply causality. That is not the
intention.
1

2

ships between role taking or empathy and Machiavellianism,
on the one hand, and the interaction process, on the other.
Weinstein wrote,

"I!i.!.~rpersonal

competence boils dovm to

the ability to manipulate other's responses.
the concept is value free

As such

Competence is relative to

the actor's purpose" {p. 755).
Since Weinstein's article, interest in the relationship between interpersonal competence and the interaction
process has been sporadic.
11

Shantz (1975) has written,

In fact, the relationship between social cognition and·

interpersonal behavior may be one of the largest unexplored
areas in developmental psychology today" (p. 303).
The present study was designed to explore the re-·
lationships among the constructs of Machiavellianism,
role taking and empathy; and.to investigate those
constructs as predictors of interpersonal behavior.

The

interpersonal behaviors studied were tendencies to behave
in an altruistic or aggressive, a cooperative or competitive
manner.

Altruistic and cooperative behavior were consider-

ed prosocial, aggressive and competitive behavior, antisocial or asocial.

These behaviors were studied using the

Prisoner's Dilemma game modified by introducing the option
of making altruistic or aggressive moves.

Cooperative and

competitive alternatives are, of course, part of the traditional Prisoner's Dilemma Game.

The preprogrammed moves

3

of the partner were varied so that some subjects played
against an altruistic partner, some against an aggressive
partner, and some against a neutral partner.
there was no option introduced.

In one condition,

The characteristics of the

partner were varied because the behavior of individuals
varies in interpersonal situations partly as a function of
interpersonal cues.
Review of the Literature
Social cognition and perspective taking. Social cognitt6nhas become the umbrella term for a host of interconnected and
overlapping concepts in social and developmental psychology
(e.g., person perception, empathy, social intelligence,
role taking, and perspective taking).

It refers to how people

"conceptualize other people and how they come to understand
the thoughts,

emotion~,

intentions, and viewpoints of others"

(Shantz, 1975, p. 258).
As pointed out earlier, numerous reviews have been
written in an attempt to synthesize findings in this area.
· In one of those reviews, Shantz (1975) classified studies of
social cognition, for heuristic purposes (neither factoranalytic nor other construct-validation studies have consistently supported any of the proposed typologies of social-cognitive
abilities), into five sets according to which of five questions
each is designed to answer:
is the other feeling?

What is the other seeing? What

What is the other thinking?

the other intending? What is the other like?

What is

4

A major distinction has been drawn between the first
four questions and related studies and the fifth.
first four sets of studies are relevant here.

Only the

They have in

common a concern with inferring another's immediate response
to the world as it impinges on him, and have been called studies
of perspective taking.

(The fifth set of studies concerns

the subject's ability to judge relatively enduring properties
of the other and has been called studies of person perception.)
Hoffman (1975) has used the term spatial role taking to
refer to the studies answering the question about what the other
is seeing and cognitive role taking for the studies answering the question about what the other is thinking.

Hoffman

has used two terms, affective role taking and empathy, to designate studies concerning what the other is feeling:

affective

role taking concerns the ability to understand the other's
feelings, empathy concerns the ability to feel sympathetically,
as well as understand, the other's feelings.
In the present study, the term empathy is used to desig_nate the ability to understand the other's feelings.

Role

taking is used to designate the ability to understand what the
other is thinking.

Perspective taking will be used as the

generic term to refer to the ability to adopt the other's
point of view, whether perceptually, cognitively, or affectively.
The study of role taking, as used in the present study,
began in 1959 when Feffer's classic article appeared describing
the Role Taking Task, a storytelling task designed to extend

5

the study of Piaget's notion of balanced decentering from
the nonsocial to the social world.

(The Role Taking Task

was used in the present study as a measure of role taking.)
In this test, the subject tells a story in response to a
TAT-like picture and then retells the same story taking
the points of view of each story character in turn.

Schnall

and Feffer (Note l) have summarized the rationale underlying
the Role Taking Task:
Piaget has suggested that lack of constancy is due to
the inordinate influence of one part of the situation
upon the estimate of the whole. That is to say, focusing only upon the increased height leads to an overestimate of quantity, while focusing upon the decreased
circumference leads to an underestimate. Piaget, accordingly, attributes the younger child's fluctuations and
extremes to the act of sequentially focusing upon one
aspect of the situation at a time. In contrast, the
older child achieves constancy of quantity by virtue of
a dominance of thought, whereby changes in both height
and circumference are simultaneously considered in
relation to each other such that the distortion engendered by one centering or perspective is balanced by the
other. Greater stability and veridicality of functioning
is thus afforded by the modulating influence of different,
simultaneously experienced, centerings of perspectives.
The concept of decentering as proposed by Piaget has
stemmed primarily from his investigations of the child's
cognitive structuring of the physical, inanimate world.
The concept can be extended, however, to the cognitive
structuring of interpersonal content, an extension which
is embodied in the structure and scoring criteria of
the RTT.
The concept of decentering which underlies the RTT
suggests that an actor, as an item of social content,
may be described from more than one point of view. The
different roles represent different points of view,
and the actor is the object upon which refocusing
takes place from these points of view. Thus, the RTT
is evaluated in terms of the degree to which the subject
is able to shift from his initial orientation in
refocusing upon his actors from different roles, while

6

at the same time maintaning continuity between his
various versions of his initial story. (pp. 9-10)
Several techniques, besides the Role Taking Task, have
been used to investigate role taking.

One popular method is a

communication task in which the subject's task is to describe
nonsense figures so that a subject who has the figures before
him can pick out the one that the subject is describing
(Glucksberg & Krauss, 1967).

Another technique (DeVries,

1970) involves the subject guessing the strategy another is using
in hiding a penny.

Still others (Flavell, Botkin, Fry, Wright,

&Jarvis, 1968) have had children explain games learned
nonverbally to sighted and blindfolded subjects or had subjects
tell stories in response to a seven-card cartoon sequence and
then retell it with some of the cards missing.

Generally,

correlations among measures of role taking have been low
or moderate, though this has varied (see Shantz, 1975).
Correlations between the Role Taking Task and measures
of intelligence have been reported in several studies.
Feffer and Gourevitch (1960) found that children's scores
on the Role Taking Task show a low positive correlation-with
verbal intelligence.

Sullivan and Hunt (1967) found a moderate

correlation between intelligence and the Role Taking Task among
11-year-old children but not among 7-and 9-year-old children.
Rubin (1974), however, reported moderate to high correlations
with intelligence.

Kurdek (Note 2) has reviewed studies which

correlate the Role Taking Task and measures of intelligence.

7

He has reported enormous variability in the correlations.
Only half of the correlations reached statistical significance,
and the significant correlations ranged from low to high.
A number of studies have investigated the relationship
between role taking and social behavior.

Feffer and Suchotliff

(1966) found positive correlations between the Role Taking Task
and observer ratings of interpersonal effectiveness.

Chaplin

and Keller (1974-) found the same with peer ratings of interpersonal effectiveness.

Rubin and Schneider (1973) found

positive correlations between communicative role taking and
both donating and helping behavior (!:.
ly) among 7-year-olds.

=

.29 and .64, respective-

Staub (1971) trained kindergarten

children in role playing of helping and being helped; those
who received training were more likely to help a child in
distress than those who did not.

Zahn-Waxler, Radke-Yarrow,

and Brady-Smith (1977) reported positive correlations between
batteries of role-taking tasks and helping and sharing behavior.
On the other hand, Ianottt' (Note 3} found no relationship between role taking and sharing behavior.

Rushton and Wiener

(1974) found no relationship between various measures of role
taking and altruism.
There is some evidence of a negative relationship between role taking and asocial behavior.

Chandler (1973} found

that delinquent boys had poorer role-taking skills than
comparable groups of nondelinquent boys.

He also found that

delinquent boys who received training in role-taking skills
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had fewer arrests in subsequent months than those who did not.
In sum, Feffer's Role Taking Task is the first of several
role-taking tasks devised to explore the development of balanced
decentering in the human world.

These tasks tend to correlate

moderately among themselves and with measures of verbal intel1ig~nce.

Though the results are mixed, measures of role taking

tend to correlate positively with prosocial behavior and
negatively with antisocial behavior.
Deutsch and Madle (1975) have traced the history of the
concept of empathy to psychologists writing in the first quarter of
this century when empathy was thought of as postural imitation.
As time passed, researchers accepted the view that empathy
was based on self-other differentiation and that empathy
involved understanding the other's affective state, either
alone or in relation to situational cues.

(Some studies have

required the subject to judge the other's emotion based on
cues exclusively from the other.
about the situation.)

Some have included information

At this time (cf. Shantz, Note 4),

empathy sometimes refers to a sympathetic emotional response
on the part of the subject and sometimes refers to the subject's
understanding of another's emotions.
As with role taking, in recent years a number of measures
of empathy have been developed.

Of particular interest as

prototypes for the present study are the works of Flapan
(1968) and Rothenberg (1970).

To study children's understanding

of social interaction, including empathy, Flapan (1968) showed
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children brief episodes from movies and asked them to retell
these episodes.

The retellings were scored for a variety of

responses, including feelings.

Rothenberg (1970) played audio-

recordings of brief interchanges between adults, and the children
were asked how the adults were feeling at various points.
Empathy was measured in the present study by the Empathy
Questionnaire (see Feczko, Note 5).

Episodes from popular

television programs were videotaped and shown to the subjects.
The videotape was stopped at critical moments, and the subjects
were asked how one of the protagonists

~as feeli~g.

The

subjects were provided with four alternative responses to
choose from.
Regarding the relationship between empathy and intelligence,
Rothenberg (1970) reported correlations of .24 between empathy
and verbal intelligence and .28 between empathy and nonverbal
intelligence.

Moir (1974) reported a moderate correlation

between empathy and intelligence (r_

~

.51).

These findings

suggest that empathy, like role taking, shows a low positive
correlation with intelligence.

Feczko (Note 6) reported a

low positive correlation (r_ = .39) between an earlier version
of the Empathy Questionnaire and intelligence.

Feczko (Note 5)

reported a low positive correlation (r = .27) between the Empathy
Questionnaire, as used in the present study, and intelligence.
Rothenberg (1970) found that empathy scores correlated
positively with peer ratings of generosity, friend.liness,
and leadership.

Johnson (1975) found a positive correlation
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between empathy and cooperativeness.

Fry (1976) found a

positive correlation between empathy and altruism and a negative
correlation with self-gratification.

On the other hand,

Levine and Hoffman (1975) did not find a correlation between
empathy and cooperativeness, among 4-year-olds, though age
may be a factor here.

Evidence regarding the relationship

between empathy and anti-social behavior is mixed.

Feshbach

and Feshbach (1969) found positive correlations between
empathy and aggression in 4- and 5-yeur-old boys, negative
correlations in 6- and 7-year-_old boys, and no correlation
among girls.

Green (1977), using film clips depicting emotions,

asked kindergarten children to identify the emotion and
state the cause.

Green found a significant positive correlation

between causal attribution and disposition to help others for
girls but not for boys.
The evidence regarding the relationship between measures
of role taking and empathy is by no means consistent.

Kurdek

and Rodgon (1975) studied correlations among various measures
or perspective taking, including measures of empathy and role
taking, in children from kindergarten through grade 6.

Empathy

and role taking tended to be uncorrelated; however, the two
correlated positive1y (r_ = .51) in fourth-grade females, but
they correlated negatively for third-grade males (r
and fifth-grade females (r_

= -.73)

= -.55). Moir (1974) found a

.49 correlation between one measure of role taking and empathy
but no significant relationship between another measure of

11

role taking and empathy.
In sum, a picture emerges from the study of empathy
similar to the one which emerged with role taking.

Measures

of empathy correlate moderately with intelligence and moderately
with measures of role taking.

Some studies show a positive

relation to prosocial behaviors, some show no relation, and no
consistent picture emerges about a relation between empathy
and antisocial behavior.
In the present study, then, role taking was measured
using the Role Taking Task, empathy using the Empathy Questionnaire.

It is appropriate to consider their characteristics

as measures in relation to the constructs they measure, role
taking and empathy.

Both the Role Taking Task and the Empathy

Questionnaire require the subject to assess another's immediate
response to the environment or definition of the situation.

In

the first, the other's understanding or cognition of the siguation is the focus, in the second the other's feelings or affect
towards the situation.

Both require the subject to assess the

situation as it impinges on the other, but the Empathy Questionnaire,
as many of the empathy measures, requires the subject to assess
verbal and nonverbal cues from the other, as well as situational
cues, to determine what the other is feeling.

The Role Taking

Task requires the subject to make up stories about characters
in situations in response to simulus cards.

The subject must

retell the facts of the story consistently while adjusting
to the shift in perspective from one character's point of view

12
to another's.

The Role Taking Task thus depends on memory

to a greater extent than the Empathy Questionnaire.

Since an

accurate understanding of emotions, as well as thoughts and
intentions, contributes to the score of the Role Taking Task
under certain circumstances, the measures are not as distinct
conceptually as one might wish.

The Empathy Questionnaire

measures the subject's ability quickly to assess another's
feeling response to an immediate situation, while the Role
Taking Task measures the subject's ability to shift from one
characterJs point of view to another's, while holding the facts
of the story in his memory.
Measures of perspective taking have been criticized,
including Borke's early works (cf. reviews by Chandler and
Greenspan, 1972, and Shantz, Note 4), because what appears
to be perspective taking may be projection.

Subjects are

notably more successful at taking the perspective of others of
like age, sex, and race.

Both measures used in the present

study involve precautions against projection.

The Empathy

Questionnaire requires the subject to understand the emotions
of adults in most instances, while the Role Taking Task allows
the child, within limits, to make up characters and situations
he feels comfortable with.
Machiavellianism. According to Christie (l970d), discussions
centering on Machiavellianism as a psychological construct
began informally during the years 1954-1955.

Several psycholo-

gists speculated that there were four primary characteristics
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of the operator or manipulator:

(a) lack of affect in inter-

personal relationships, (b) lack of concern with conventional
morality, (c) lack of gross psychopathology, and (d) low
ideological commitment.

Shortly thereafter, Christie (1970b)

constructed a scale to assess Machiavellianism with Machiavelli's -The Prince and -The Discourses being the source for
statements, which distinguish responses of high and low Machs.
Ultimately, two versions of the Mach scales were devised:
Mach IV, a Likert-type scale, and Mach V, a forced-choice
scale designed to control for social desirability.

By the

mid '60s, articles had begun to appear in the literature
using the Mach scales, and in 1970 Christie and Geis' Studies
j_!! Machiavellianism appeared summarizing previous work and

formulating the notions of high and low Mach.

Since then,

scattered articles have appeared in the literature.
Weinstein was among the early researchers (see, for
example, Weinstein, Beckhouse, Blumstein, & Stein, 1968), and
his article on social competence, antedating Studies in
Machiavellianism, was less than comprehensive in its treatment
of Machiavellianism.
Mach uses

11

According to

l~einstein

(1969), !h<:! high

any line of action if it appears to promote profitable

outcomes for him

11

(p. 770).

And

~..Jeinstein

evidence seems to suggest that persons

wrote, "The emperical

h1£!1.5~n

Machiavellianism

are more interpersonally competent ..• A touch of psychopathy,
then, may be helpful if success in controlling others is the
object

11

(p. 770).

The low Mach, in contract, is characterized

14

by rigidity and rule-boundedness.

Rigid_ individuals have been

taught that there is safety in conforming to role behavior.
They (ll ~-~ tend to become ego-i nvo 1ved to their own detriment
while, for the high Mach, "No line of action has cost value
due to loss of self-esteem" (p. 770).

In other words, in his

early formulation, Weinstein has related Machiavellianism
at a theoretical level to ego structure and to role performance.
Perhaps with an eye to understanding Machiavellianism in
relation to ongoing social interaction, Geis and Christie
(1970) have distinguished high and.low Machs accofdfng to what
might be called their interpersonal stance.

They have sum-

mari zed the traits of the high Machs as p'the coo 1 syndrome, 11
~•=« .l,.,.-,-•o

·"""=-""'"'

'~"~

__ ,

~·¥

which involves (a) resistance to social influence, (b) orienta....__....,._~,.._,..,~

>-·

'

""

tion to cognitions, and (3) initiating structure and controlling
it.

Low Machs, in contrast, were characterized as "the soft

touch, 11 involving (a) susceptibility to social influence,
(b) oriented to persons, and (c) accepting and following of
structure.

Int_~rpersonally~

high Machs spend their time

manipulating, while low Machs encounter.

"Encountering is a

process by which we change through direct contact with one
another.

Encountering happens when we open up to one another"

(Geis &Christie, 1970, p. 260).

In contrast to Weinstein

(1969) who said that high Machs are more competent interpersonally than low Machs, Geis and Christie (1970) indicated
that high and low Machs operate differently in an interpersonal
context, the implication being each excels interpersonally,
..._,,.,.

<•'"···~·

-·
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but in dHferent ways.

Indeed, high Machs do not outmani pul ate

low Machs in all situation.

High Machs excel in situations where

there is face-to-face interaction,

l~titude

for improvisation,

and the development of task-irrelevant affect.
The relationship between Machiavellianism and a number of
other personality measures has been studied, and some of the
results are relevant to the present study.
has summarized these findings.

Christie (1970a)

Correlations between intelligence

and Machiavellianism have been consistently low and nonsignificant,
suggesting strongly that Machiavellianism and intelligence are,
in fact, unrelated.

This is compatible with Weinstein's (1969)

distinction between empathy and Machiavellianism in which he
views them as separate, and by implication uncorrelated, and
views intelligence as one aspect of empathy or role taking.
Not surprisingly, Machiavellians take a dim view of human
nature.

Christie (1970c) reported correlations between

Machiavellianism and Wrightsman's philosophies of human nature
(Wrightsman, 1964).

There was a correlation of -.67 with the

view that others are trustworthy, -.54 with the view that others
are altruistic, -.47 with the view that others are independent,
and -.38 with the view that others have pronounced strength
of will.

A number of findings have suggested that high Machs

tend to be more hostile and suspicious than low Machs; however,
there was no correlation between Machiavellianism and the
MMPI scales, including psychopathy.

Thus, it seems that,

although high Machs may tend to be hostile and suspicious,
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it may be inappropriate to label them sociopathic.
Recently, Delia and O'Keefe (1976) studied the relationship between Machiavellianism and complexity of interpersonal
constructs.

Complexity was measured by the number of constructs

used in written descriptions of peers, one liked and one
disliked.

The authors found correlations of -.54 and -.49,

respectively.

These results are compatible with the view

that low Machs are

mor~

oriented to people than high Machs.

Numerous studies have compared the performance of high
and low Machs in experimental situations.

In a study, which

could be classified as an empathy study or a study of person
perception, Geis and Levy (1970) required subjects to choose
from the members of a group which had been playing a structured
coalition game, the person they felt they could "size up"
mose accurately.

The subjects then filled out the Mach IV

scale as they believed the other person would.

It was found

that high Machs' judgments tended to be closer to the actual
group mean than low Machs s judgments, but low Machs were mere
1

accurate in judging others• positions relative to themselves.
High Machs overestimated the scores of low Machs and underestimated the scores of high Machs, thereby achieving a relatively
accurate estimate of the mean but not of the separate groups.
Low Machs underestimated the scores of both, slightly in the
case of low Machs and greatly in the case of high Machs, thereby
judging the position of others accurately relative to themselves
but misjudging the group mean.

The implication of this study
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is that high Machs render accurate judgments about people in
general, but are not accurate in their estimation of the position of others relative to themselves, the reverse being true
of 1ow Machs.
Christie and Geis (1970) reviewed an unpublished study by
Geis and Leventhal in which subjects defended positions, as in
a formal debate.

Sometimes the subjects defended positions

they privately endorsed, sometimes positions they did not
endorse privately.

The same subjects also acted as judges

whose task it was to judge whether the debaters were defending
positions they privately endorsed or did not endorse. Low
Machs were better than high Machs at judging whether subjects
were telling the truth or lying.
both low and high Mach subjects.

They were better judges of

High Machs............ were
not better
___
deceivers than low Machs; however, they were better truth
tellers:

··-·"··~- --.-·~~·'-·

,

,..

judges believed they were telling the truth when they

were telling the truth more often than they believed low Machs.
These results support the notion that lpw

Ma~hs

are better

judges of people than high Machs.
High Machs seem to be better able to persuade others to
believe them or to do things against their will than low Machs.
In one experiment (Geis, Christie, & Nelson, 1970) in which
subjects were given the role of experimenter in a psychological
experiment, high Machs were more effective and innovative
deceivers.

Braginsky (1970) assigned children to persuade

other children to eat crackers which had been soaked in a
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solution of quinine.

High-Mach children were more successful

than low-Mach children in gaining compliance.
The behavior of high and low Machs has been compared using
a variety of competitive games.

The general finding has been

that high Machs win more than low Machs on all but the Prisoner's
Dilemma game.

This has contributed to the theory that high·

Machs excel under conditions of face-to-face interaction with
latitude for improvisation and arousal of irrelevant affect.
At lease half a dozen studies involving Machiavellianism
have used the Prisoner's Dilemma paradigm.

Wrightsman (1966)

studied differences in Mach scores as a function of trusting
or distrusting in the Prisoner's Dilemma game.

Subjects were

classified trusting if their first move was cooperative and if
they gave as their reason that they expected the other to
reciprocate.

Subjects were classified as mistrustful if their

first move was competitive and said they expected their partner
to reciprocate.

High and low Machs did not differ significantly

in their trustfulness as measured in this situation.
Christie, Gergen, and Marlowe (1970) reported a study in
which cooperativeness of partner and type of reward were
varied.

It made no difference in the subjects' play whether the

partner played 20%, 50%, or 80% cooperatively, nor did it make
any difference whether the subject was high Mach or low Mach.
The only significant finding was that
more competitive over time.

-~~gh Ma_c:_~s

became

To vary type of incentive, the
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authors started off with an initial 10 trials for points
and then shifted to dollars or pennies.
after each trial.

Payment was made

High Machs became more cooperative in the

dollar condition and won less than low Machs.

Anbther finding

was that high Machs were more retaliatory, responding heavily
with competitive moves after the partner made a competitive
move.

These results suggest that high Machs may attempt a pro-

social strategy, but if this fails, they tend to retaliate.
High Machs seem to be parti cul ar·ly responsive to monetary
.rewards.
Christie et al. (1970) also reviewed an unpublished
study by Wahlin in which he studied responses to a vindictive
other.

When the subject played competitively the programmed

other p·layed a series of competitive moves.

Low Machs did

not retaliate and won a significant number of points in
contrast to high Machs who retaliated and lost a significant
number of points.

This is further evidence that high Machs are

retaliatory.
Lake's unpublished study was summarized by Wrightsman,
O'Conner, and Baker (1972):
Lake compared subjects who scored high on Machiavellianism with those scoring low when both groups were
given information as to whether the other player was
cooperative or competitive. Forming an impression that
the other was cooperative led low and high Machs to
increase their own cooperativeness, but much more so
for lows than for highs. Anticipating a competitive
other led low Machs to be defensive and high Machs to
be aggressive. {p. 242)
Uejio and Wrightsman (1972) reported negative correlations
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between Machiavellianism and cooperativeness in a game where
the partner played 76% cooperatively.

Finally, Swan (1973) found

that high Machs were more cooperative than low Machs against a
cooperative other and just as cooperative against a competitive
other.
In sum, the results on cooperativeness and competitiveness
of high and low Machs in the Prisoner's Dilemma game are not
consistent; however, it does appear that high Machs are more
retaliatory than low Machs.

It is not clear how the payoff

matrix influences the behavior of high and low Machs.

Perhaps

different consequences in different payoff matrices might explain
differences in cooperativeness and competitiveness.

In fact,

Christie et al. (1970) have suggested that it would be useful
to vary the payoff matrix to see whether high Machs adapt
their play to differences in payoff matrices more rationally
than low Machs.
Behavior of high and low Machs has been compared on several
other types of experimental games.

Durkin (1970), for example,

described a game in which pairs of subjects held handles of
a large plexiglass spiral.

The whole apparatus resembled a

large spiral wedding cake with handles sticking out of the sides
at the bottom.

The objective was to move a ball up to the top

by tilting the spiral.

High Machs were not more effective than

low Machs; however, the scores of high-Mach pairs were predictable from individual scores.

Scores of low-Mach pairs

depended more on the combination of individuals.

Durkin
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concluded that this supports the idea that low Machs become more
personally involved than high Machs in situations of face-to-face
interaction.

It v1as a simple task with little opportunity for

improvisation or manipulation.
In most experimental games, especially negotiation or
coalition games, high Machs have a definite advantage.
11

In the

legislature game" (Geis, Weinheimer, & Berger, 1970), subjects

were to persuade fellow "congressmen" to vote certain ways on
certain issues.

High and Low Machs did not differ in their

persuasiveness on noncontroversial issues; however, high Machs
were much more effective than low Machs when dealing with
controversial ones.

Presumably low Machs were distracted by

and became involved in the controversial issues while high
Machs did not.

Geis (1970) found that high Machs were much

more effective than low Machs in forming coalitions to their
own advantage in a standard coalition game where subjects play
parchesi with the option of forming coalitions to their mutual
advantage.
In sum, regarding Machiavellianism, it appears that (a)
Machiavellianism is uncorrelated with intelligence; (b) high
Machiavellians have a negative or pessimistic view of people;
(c) Machiavellianism is positively correlated with a hostile
attitude towards people in general and a tendency towards
retaliation, though this should not be termed psychopathy;
(d) low Machs are better at understanding individuals and
individual differences, though high Machs may have a more
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accurate general unders tan ding of people; (e) _lgw Machs become
more involved with others than high Machs, and their task performance is more heavily influenced by the person they are
cooperating with; (f) high Machs tend to be more persuasive
than low Machs; ( g) in the Prison er s Oil emma game, high Machs
1

do not win more, and they may even win ·1 ess if they become
involved in retaliatory behavior; (h) in the Prisoner's Dilemma
game, high Machs are sometimes more cooperative than low Machs
and sometimes less, but they seem to become more competitive
over time; and

(i}__~_!_g~Mach~

At:€. definitely more effective at

negotiation and coalition games than low Machs.
The Prisone_r's Dilemma game and interpersonal behavior styles.
The Prisoner's Dilemma game is a two-person matrix game which has
been used extensively by psychologists to study cooperative and
competitive behavior.

Nemeth (1972) has retold the anecdote

which explains the rationale underlying the Prisoner's Dilemma
game:
The original anecdote of the Prisoner's Dilemma concerns
two individuals accused of a crime but who are interviewed
separately by the police without being able to communicate
with one another. Each prisoner is faced with two
alternatives: either to confess to the crime or not to
confess to it. If both individuals do not confess, both
will be acquitted. On the other hands if one prisoner
confesses and the other does not, the individual who
confesses will not only go free but will also receive
a reward for turning state's evidence, while his partner
who did not confess will be given a more severe sentence
than if he had confessed. However, if both prisoners
confess, both will be convicted (p. 206).
In the game, move X, the cooperative move; corresponds td·nat:
confessing, while move Y, the competitive move, corresponds to
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confessing.

In the classical Prisoner's Delemma game, the

values in the payoff matrix are arranged so that player who
plays Y (confesses) while his opponent plays X (does not confess)
wins the most points while his opponent wins the least points.
If neither confesses {XX), each receives the second highest
number of points.

If both confess (YY), each receives the

third highest number of points.

The payoff matrix described

above (XX= 4, 4; XY = 0, 5; YY = l, l) is an example of
scoring in a classical Prisoner's Dilemma game.
In the Prisoner's Dilemma game, each player, independently
of the other, makes one of two moves on each trial, a cooperative
move (X in the present study, C in conventional notation) or a
competitive move (Y in the present study, D in conventional
notation).

The number of points that a player wins on any given

trial depends on the combination of his move and his opponent's
move (XX, XY, YX, or YY).

The points won for the different

combinations are specified in the payoff matrix.

In one game

condition in the present study, for example, both players won
4 points for the XX combination, the Y-player won 5 points
and the X-player 0 points in the XY combination, and both
players won l point in the YY combination.

At the end of the

game, scores, number of Xs, and number of Ys were summed.
(As the number of Xs plus the number of Ys was a constant, this
was redundant.)
In the present study, subjects in three of the partner
conditions (B, C, D) were given an option (cf. Anchor &Cross,
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1974; Berger &Tedeschi, 1969) to make an altruistic move
("help"), an aggressive move ("zap"), or no move.

Using the

help option, the subject gave his opponent points at a cost to
himself.

Using the zap option, the subject took points away

at a cost to himself.
In most studies, the opponent's moves in the Prisoner 1 s
Dilemma game are programmed so that the subject's responses to
a predetermined other can be studied.

In the present study,

the partner played randomly 50 percent Xs and 50 percent Vs.
Partner conditions were varied so Partner B was altruistic
(made mostly altruistic moves during the option period),
Partner C was aggressive (played mostly aggressive moves during
the option period), and Partner D was neutral (made no moves
during the option period).
ways.

The game has been varied in countless

The length of the game has been varied, as have the

percentage of X and Y moves and the values in the payoff matrix.
In sum, then, the Prisoner's Di1emma game is an elegantly
simple device for studying cooperative and competitive behavior
in an experimental situation which can be modified to include
the study of aggressive and altruistic behavior.

It has been

criticized as an oversimplification of the bargaining situation
(cf. Nemeth, 1972), but it continues to be used to study
cooperative and competitive behavior.
Altruism and cooperation, aggression and competition have,
of course been legitimate topics for study in psychology for
many years; however, the prosocial behaviors, altruism and
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cooperation, have received increased attention in recent years
(see Harris &Siebel, 1975; Hoffman, 1975; Rushton, 1976;
Rushton & Wiener, 1975).

Generally, prosocial and asocial

behavior have been studied separately, but recently MacCrimmon
and Messick (1976) defined the four terms in relation to each
other in a way which lends itself to the matrix-game situation.
Altruism and aggression concern only payoffs or consequences
for the opponent.

Altruistic behavior maximizes payoffs,

while aggressive behavior minimizes payoffs.

Cooperation and

competition, on the other hand, take into account payoffs to
both self and other.

Cooperation increases the sum of payoffs

to self and other, while competition increases the difference
between payoffs to self and other.
These represent purely behavioral definitions of altruism
and cooperation, aggression and competition; that is, they do
not take into account subjective factors, such as intention,
motivation, or perception, which have been considered important
aspects of those behaviors by many experts.

Thus, Feshbach (1970)

indicated that aggressive behavior may be defined as behavior
which harms others or behavior which is intended to harm others.
McCauley and Berkowitz (1970) and Hoffman (1977) have pointed
to a similar distinction regarding altruism:

some definitions

concern only consequences, some intentions as well as consequences.
Generally, these issues have not been raised regarding cooperation
and competition.

Generally, the focus here has been the nature

of the .interdependence (cf. Deutsch, 1962), whether increasing
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the payoffs for one increases the payoffs for the other or
whether it lessens the payoffs for the other.
With regard to aggression, there is commonly a distinction
between instrumental aggression, in which the subject has
nonaggressive goals served by the aggressive behavior, and
hostile aggression, in which the intention is simply to harm the
other (cf. Feshbach, 1969).
made regarding altruism.

A similar distinction might be

In the present study, with the

behavioral definition of the various behaviors, it is impossible
to say why the subject aggressed or helped; in other words, the
distinction has not been made.
A number of generalizations have been made regarding
the effects of partners and payoff matrices which apply here.
Berkowitz (1974) has reviewed a series of studies done primarily
by him concerning the effect of others on impulsive aggression:
this review leads him to conclude,

11

an external object or

event is capable of evoking impulsive aggressive reactions to
the extent that it has aggressive meaning; i.e., is associated
with aggression 11 (p. 153).

This observation would lead one to

expect greater aggressiveness on the part of subjects playing
against an aggressive other.

It has sometimes been found that

subjects playing against a cooperative partner are more cooperative
than subjects playing against a competitive partner (Christie et al.,
1970; Wrightsman, Davis, Lucker, Bruininks, Evans, Wilde,
Paulson, & Clark, 1972).

This finding suggests that subjects

tend to respond in kind towards their partners.

(It should be
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noted that with the Prisoner's Dilemma game this has not
always been found; cf. Nemeth, 1972.)
Finally, it should be noted that subjects playing in a
game with a payoff matrix which rewards cooperation tend to
cooperate more than those playing in a game which rewards
competition (Wrightsman et al., 1972).
Hypotheses
Machiavellianism, role taking, and empathy.
1.

There is no significant correlation between scores in the
Role Taking Task and Empathy Questionnaire.

2.

High Machs score significantly higher on the Role Taking
Task than low Machs.

3.

Low Machs score significantly higher on the Empathy Questionnaire than high Machs.

4.

Subjects scoring high on the Role Taking Task are signifi_cantly more cooperative (score higher on SumX} than those
scoring low.

5.

Subjects scoring high on the Empathy Questionnaire are
significantly more cooperative (score higher on SumX)
than those scoring low.

6.

Subjects scoring high on the Role Taking Task are significantly more altruistic (score higher on Altruism) than
those scoring low.

7.

Subjects scoring high on the Empathy Questionnaire are
significantly more altruistic (score lower on Altruism)
than those scoring low.
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Machiavellianism, partner, and Prisoner s Dilemma game.
1

8.

High Machs win significantly more points (score higher on
Total Score) than low Machs.

9.

High Machs play significantly more rationally (score
higher on Judgment) than low Machs.

10.

High Machs become significantly more competitive (score
lower on Change in the second half) in the course of
the game.

11.

High Machs play significantly more aggressively {score
lower on Altruism) than low Machs.

12.

Subjects playing against an aggressive partner {Partner C)
are significantly more aggressive (score lower on Altruism)
than those playing against other partner (Partners Band D).

CHAPTER II
METHOD
Subjects
Subjects were 80 10- and 11-year-old children, 40 boys
and 40 girls, recruited from two parochial schools in Chicago.
Both schools were in middle-class neighborhoods.

Initially,

principals were talked to by telephone, and the first two who
agreed to large-scale testing of fifth- and sixth-grade
children were used.

Parents were sent consent forms describing

the project {see Appendix A), and most of the children whose
parents consented participated in at least the first session.
Thirty-eight of the 118 children who participated in the first
session were not included in the final sample.

Five were

eliminated because their verbal IQ scores fell below 95 on the
Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (Dunn, 1970) or the Cognitive
Abilities Test (Thorndike, Hogan, & Lorge, 1968), which were
used as screening instruments.

Twenty-five were eliminated

because they did not return for one or more of the subsequent
session.

Seven were eliminated because they duplicated subjects

already tested in one of the categories defined by sex,
Machiavellianism, and type of partner.

Finally, one was

eliminated because he was judged to have insufficient command
of English to handle the verbal tasks.
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Subjects were assigned to the different levels of the
independent variables in the original design in such a manner
as to insure 5 subjects in each of the 16 cells.

The 16

cells were a product of crossing sex (male, female), Machiavellianism (high Mach, low Mach), and partner (Partner A, Partner B,
Partner C, and Partner D).

In the subsequent analysis, the

measures of role taking and empathy were included as factors.
This resulted in a 4 (partner) x 2 (sex) x 2 (Machiavellianism)
x 2 (role taking) x 2 (empathy) analysis of variance for
unequal

_12.

Means and standard deviations for age and social class
as a function of the three primary independent variables are
presented in Table 1.

Social-class standing was computed

using the Two Factor Index of
Note 7).

~ocial

Position (Hollingshead,

The social-class score based on this index is derived

from the occupation of the head of household and the education
of head of household.

Scores for each vary from 1 to 7, 1

referring to the highest occupational or educational category,
7 to the lowest.
a weight of 4.

Occupation is given a weight of 7, education
Thus a family in the highest occupational and

educational category receives a score of 11 ((1 x 7) + (1 x 4)

=

11), while a family in the lowest occupational and educational

category receives a 77 ((7 x 7) + (7 x 4)

=

77).

To determine

whether the differences between the groups for social-class were
larger than might be expected by chance, a 1 test was done
on the greatest differences between the means.

The only

significant difference was between high and low Machs.
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Table 1
Means and Standard Deviations for Age and Social Class of
Subjects for Sex, Partner, and Machiavellianism
Variable

n

Age

Socia 1 Cl ass

Sex
Male

40

M
SD

11.03
.65

14.32

Female

40

M
SD

11.03
.62

31. 82
17.02

A

20

M
SD

11.05
.67

30. 15
17. 51

B

20

M
SD

10.96
.66

36.35
16.38

c

20

M
SD

10.97
.57

34.75
13. 21

D

20

M

11. 13

SD

.66

28.60
14.99

M
SD

10.99
.68

28.27
14.04

M

11.07
.58

36.65
16.20

11. 03
.63

32.46
15.64

33.10

Partner

Mach
High

40

Low

40

SD

Grand Total

80

M

SD
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High Machs were significantly higher in social status {mean
28.27) than low Machs {mean

l (78)

=

2.77, £ L .01.

=

36.65).

=

This was significant,

This is consistent with the frequently

reported negative correlation between a social class and
Machiavellianism (Christie, 1970c).
Materials
Kiddie Mach test.

The Kiddie Mach test (Christie, 1970d),

a 20-item, Likert-type scale, is basically a revision of the
Mach IV in which items were simplified to make them more
readily comprehensible to sixth graders.
positively keyed; for example, in item 20,

Half the items are
11

It hurts more to

lose money than to lose a friend!" agreement indicates a proMachiavellian attitude.
fir example, in item 2,

Half the items are negatively keyed;
11

Most people are good and kind, 11 agree-

ment indicates an anti-Machiavellian attitude.
In the present study, subjects were required to indicate
their responses to particular questions (see Appendix A for
the Kiddie Mach as used in the present study) by circling
agree a lot, agree a little, no opinion, disagree a lfttle,
or disagree a Jot.

The extreme pro-Machiavellian response

was given a score of 5, the extreme anti-Machiavellian response
a score of 1.

Thus, scores ranged, theoretically, from a

low of 20 to a high of 100.

The scores actually ranged from

a low of 31 to a high of 71 with a mean of 50.94.

Subjects

were divided into high and low Machs using a score close to
the median.

In the initial assignment of subjects, boys and girls
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were assigned separately to conditions of high and low Mach,
the cut off for boys being 51.5 and the cut off for girls
50.5.

In subsequent analyses, the cut off for the entire

sample was 51.5, which resulted in a distribution with 38
high Machs and 42 low Machs.
Perspective-taking measures.

The perspective-taking

tasks administered in the present study were Feffer's Role
Taking Task (Feffer, 1959) and the Empathy Questionnaire
(Feczko, Note 5).

In the Role Taking Task, the subject is

presented with a picture or photograph, usually an action
picture involving two or more characters, and asked to tell
a story about the characters in the picture.

After he has

told his initial story, the story having been tape recorded
or transcribed, the story is repeated to check for accuracy and
to refresh the subject's memory.

The subject is then asked to

retell the story as if he were one of the characters in
his own story; i.e., he is asked to take the role of that
character.

The subject is then asked to take the role of each

of the characters in the story in succession.

The subject's

role-taking score is a function of his ability to shift his
point of view consistently from one character to another in the
story he himself has made up.
Scores are assigned in relation to four categories which
are ordered according to the number of aspects of the situation
which are coordinated simultaneously.

The four levels are (a)

simple refocusing--a shift to the point of view of a particular
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character in the retelling, (b) character elaboration--in
addition, the subject portrays the other characters consistently with the point of view of the character whose point of
view he is adopting, (c) perspective elaboration--in addition,
there must be a clear inner-outer orientation:

the subject

must reveal something about the inner state of the character
whose role he is taking, while he must see the same character
exclusively from the outside when he appears in the story
as told from the point of view of another character, and (d)
change of perspective--in addition,

11

the subject must have two

perspective elaborations involving the same two actors"
{Schnall & Feffer, Note 1, p.30).
There are three levels of simple refocusing (scores 1-3),
three levels of character elaboration (scores 4-6), five levels
of perspective elaboration (scores 7-11), and eight levels of
change of perspective (scores 14-22).

The discontinuity in

scores between perspective elaboration and change of perspective
occurs because change of perspective is a combination of two
perspective elaborations which may vary from 7-11.

To arrive

at an appropriate score, the scorer compares statements about
the same character as they appear in different versions of the
same story.
11

Thus, for example, to receive a score within

perspective elaboration," the subject, when taking the point

of view of a given character, must give information about the
inner state of that character, but limit himself to information
about externals when that same character appears in other versions

35

of the same story.

Each story is scored separately for

each character.
In the present study, the Role Taking Task consisted of
responses to two different pictures.

The first was a picture of

a teacher with two little girls, one painting and the other having
just spilled some paint.

The second was a picture of several

boys playing on a slide in a playground.

A small boy was

sliding down towards a bigger boy who had run up from the bottom.
Several other boys were crowding up the ladder, and one in
particular was holding out his fist towards the boy climbing up.
In administering this second picture, the tester specifically
pointed out the boy shaking his fist, the boy in the middle
of the slide, and the boy at the bottom of the slide as the
characters to be focused on in telling a story.

A fairly common

response to the first picture involved a teacher who had come
over to watch one of her students paint.

A second student

became jealous and spilled the paint to get the teacher's
attention.

A fairly common r.esponse to the second picture

involved a bully running up the slide while the little boy
was sliding down.

The boys yelled at the bully, telling him to

let them slide down.
With few exceptions, each story had three·characters and,
hence, three scores.

Scores from the two stories were summed

to make the total score, the one used in the present study.

In

the few cases where the subject used two characters, the mean
was added to the total, yielding a more accurate estimate of the
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subject's role-taking ability.

The present author and another

graduate student first scored 10 protocols blindly, compared
their scores to make sure the scoring criteria were clear,
and then scored 10 more records blindly to establish interrater
reliability.

The results were correlated, yielding an interrater

reliability of .93.

The correlation was computed using the

Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient: This author
then scored the bulk of the protocols.
36 to 57 with a mean of 47.57.

The scores ranged from

When role-taking ability was

considered an independent variable, high role taking and low
role taking were defined by a cut off point near the median.
The cut off point was 47.5.

This resulted in 43 high role takers

and 37 low role takers.
The Empathy Questionnaire, developed by Feczko (Note 5),
measures the child's ability to identify correctly the feelings
of others as inferred from their words and actions as well as
the situation.

The measure is based on particularly dramatic

videotape vignettes taken from the popular television programs
Kojak, Delvecchio, Serpico, The Brady Bunch, The Andy Griffith
Show, and The Bob Newhart Show.

Vignettes are of approximately

3 minutes duration, long enough to enable the child to grasp the
situation but short enough to hold his attention.

At specified

moments during the vignettes, the videotape is stopped, and the
subjects are asked how one of the main characters is feeling.
The subject then circles the response which he feels best
reflects the character's feelings (see Appendix A for the actual
questions and choices of answers).
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The programs and vignettes were chosen to inc1ude both
prosocial and antisocial behavior and to display emotions of
varying degrees of subtlety.

In a11 cases, children were

asked to identify the emotions of adu1ts.

This approach was

used in order to minimize the like1ihood of this being a measure
of similarity projection rather than a measure of persona1ity
stereotyping or individuation (cf. Rothenberg, 1970; Weinstein,
1969).
For each of the 20 questions, the four possible answers
are ordered for scoring purposes according to how accurately
they reflect the feelings the character is experiencing, the
best answer receiving a score of 4, the worst a score of l
(see Appendix A).

To assign ratings or scores to the choices,

eight advanced graduate students in clinical psychology were
asked to rate the choices.

Thus, scores range from a theoretical

high of 80 to a low of 20.

The actual scores ranged from a high

of 77 to a low of 50 with a mean of 62.32.

When empathy was

considered as an independent variable in the present ·study,,
those high on empathy were distinguised from those 1ow on
empathy by a median split, using 62.5 as the median.

This

cutoff divided the distribution into 37 lows and 43 highs.
Prisoner's Dilemma game.

As explained previously, the

Pri saner' s Dilemma game can be understood as an analog of
the predicament two suspects find themselves in when both are
accused of having committed a crime and are interrogated
1

separately by police.

Each has a choice of confessing (move
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Y in the present game, the competitive move) or not confessing
(move X in the present game, the cooperative move).

Each knows

that if neither he nor his partner confesses, they will
both go free.
convicted.

Each knows that if both confess, both will be

Each also knows that if one confesses, while the

partner does not, the one who confesses will go free and·
receive a reward for turning state's evidence, while the
partner will receive a more severe penalty than as if both
had confessed.

Each is simultaneously motivated to confess

and not to confess.
or not confessing are

The consequences to each of confessing
dependen~

upo11 whether the partner confesses

or does not confess, and neither knows what the other will do.
(Nemeth, 1972).
In the classical Prisoner's Dilemma game, points are
given for each of the four possible combinations of moves
(confess - not confess or Y - X; not confess - not confess
or X - X; confess - confess or Y - Y; and not confess confess or X - Y) so that the Y-player in the first wins
most; the X-players in the next win less; the Y-players in the
next win still less; and the X-player in the last wins the
least.

Game 2, in the present study, is an example of a classic

Prisoner's Dilemma game:
Your move

Partner's move

Your points

Partner's points

5

0

x

x
x

4

4

y

y

1

1

x

y

0

5

y
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Playing against a partner who plays randomly 50% Xs and 50%
Vs, it is to the subject's advantage to play Vs ..
Game 1 is a modification of the Prisoner s Dilemma game in
1

which it is to the subject's advantage to play Xs against a
partner who plays randomly 50% Xs and 50% Ys:
Your move

Partner 1 s move Your points

Partner 1 s points
0

x

x
x

6

6

y

y

1

1

x

y

0

3

y

3

Game 1 is not a classical Prisoner's Dilemma game because the
highest payoff is for the X - X-players, not for the V-player
in the Y - X combination.

The player who plays Xs consistently

in Game 1 wins on the average 3 points a game, while the player
who plays Vs consistently wins 2 points a game on the average.
The consequences of playing Xs and Ys are reversed in Game 2.
The more logical players would be expected to adapt their
play to these differences.
Procedure
Subject recruitment was begun by te 1ephone calls to
principals of local parochial grammar schools.

The researcher,

after identifying himself as a graduate student in psychology,
explained the nature of the study and its requirements in
terms of time.

It was stressed that participation would be

entirely voluntary on the part of the children and their parents,
that the project had been approved by the university ethics
committee and the researcher s dissertation committee.
1
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Three of the first six or seven principals contacted agreed,
and two of those were selected.
Parental consent forms were sent home (see Appendix A)
and children whose parents consented were given the initial
set of tests.

Testing was done in the school itself, during

school hours at one school and affer school at the other.
The first session included the Kiddie Mach test and other
tests used in a study by another graduate student (see
Feczko, Note 5), whose research overlapped the present work.
The instructions to the Kiddie Mach were read aloud (see
Appendix A), and the tester answered questions.

The tester

then read each of the 20 questions aloud and paused at the
end of each to allow the children to circle their answers.
In cases where children asked about the individual items, the
tester explained them as simply as possible.

When the testing

was over, the tester collected the papers and thanked the children.
The Role Taking Task and the Empathy Questionnaire were
administered in a second session.

Although there was some

variation in the testing format, most of the children were
tested in groups of eight, four taking the Empathy Questionnaire with Ms. Feczko and four taking the Role Taking Task with
this researcher and three assistants (a graduate student and
two undergraduate students) who had been selected, trained, and
supervised by Feczko and this researcher.
In the present study, each subject had 40 moves, two sets
of 10 in Game 1 and two sets of 10 in Game 2.

The sequence of
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games was either 1, 2, 1, 2, or 2, l, 2, 1.

To counterbalance

for order-of-presentation effects, half the subjects began with
Game 1 and half with Game 2.

(See Appendix A for the actual

form the subjects received.) _In_ the Prisoner's Oil emma game,
which is most often played against a mechanical device programmed
to play a set sequence of Xs and Vs, the subject believes he
is playing against an actual partner who is moving (playing Xs
and Vs) simultaneously with him and who is receiving his moves
just as he believes he is receiving his partner's moves.

As

previously mentioned partner, in the present study, a confederate
of the investigator, played randomly 50% Xs and 50% Vs.

Against

such a partner, a consistent X-player would win an average
of 3 points a move in Game l and 2 points a move in Game 2,
while a consistent V-player would win an average of 2 points a
move in Game l and 3 points a move in Game 2.

The rational

player who understands the differences between Matrix 1 and
Matrix 2 and the partner's style of play will play mostly Xs
in Game l and mostly Vs in Game 2.

(This perhaps oversimplified

approach does not take into account the subject's attempts to
influence his partner's game behavior.)
11

X-V Game,

11

This describes the

as the children ca 11 ed it, as it was played by

children in the Partner-A (no option) condition.
Berger and Tedischi (1969) have described a zap option
11

in the Prisoner s Oil emma Game.
1

11

Every seven moves, the subject has

the option of zapping his partner; i.e., taking points away from
11

11

the partner at a cost to himself.

The present study also included
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a help option, in which the subject could give his partner
11

11

points at a cost to himself.

Every five moves in the Partner-B,

Partner-C, and Partner-D conditions, the subject had the option
of zapping his partner (taking 10 points away at a cost of two
points), helping him (giving him 10 points at a cost of two
points), or doing nothing.
eight options.

In the 40 moves, then, there were

In the Partner-B condition, the partner helped

six times and did nothing twice.

In the Partner-C condition,

the partner zapped six times and did nothing twice.

In the

Partner-D condition, the partner did nothing all eight.times.
The three option conditions were more complex than the nooption condition (Partner A); the subject had a larger arsenal of
behavior at his disposal, and he had more information about his
partner.

Partner B was fundamentaliy altruistic, Partner C

hostile or aggressive, and Partner D neutral.
Six scores were derived from the Prisoner's Dilemma game;
Total Score, Judgment, SumX, Altruism, Change, and Difference.
Total Score, Judgment, SumX, and Change had to do with patterns
of Xs and Ys and applied to subjects

i~

all partner conditions.

Altruism and Difference had to do with the subject's tendency to
use the help or zap option and applied only to subjects in
Partner conditions B, C, and D.
Total Score was the sum total of points a subject won in
a game, excluding the effects of the options:

it referred to the

total points each subject won as a result of the combination of
Xs and Ys.

It was a measure of general effectiveness in the game.
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Judgment was the sum of Xs played in Game l minus the sum
of Xs played in Game 2.

Since it was advantageous to play Xs

in Game l and Ys in Game 2, due to differences in the payoff
matrices, Judgment reflected the subject's understanding of the
matrices and his ability to adapt to the differences.

(This,

of course, assumed that the subject focused on the payoff matrices
per se.

It is theoretically possible that the subject might

have understood the differences in the payoff matrices but
because of his particular strategy did not respond to the
difference.)
Sum X was the sum of the Xs the subject played and was considered a measure of cooperativeness.

Since there were 40

moves in all and the alternative to X was Y, Sum X was directly
related to the proportion of X moves.
Altruism was the sum of option scores and so applied only
to subjects in Partners B, C, and D conditions.

A positive

score indicated a tendency towards a1truism, a negative score
a tendency towards aggression.

Corresponding to the points

the subject gave or took away from the opponent during the
option move, a zap counted -1, a help +l, and no move counted
0.

The structure of the game and the Altruism score rest on

the assumption that altruism and aggression are mutually exclusive
and represent polar opposites.

These are by no means self-

evi dent.
Change was the number of Xs in the second two games minus
the number of Xs in the first two games.

A positive score
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indicated increased cooperativeness in the course of the game.
Difference was the change score for the option and was
arrived at by subtracting the option points of the first two
games from the option points of the second two games.

A positive

score indicated a change to a more positive or less negative play.
To take the Role Taking Task, the child was seated
opposite the tester facing him.

The picture was placed next

to the tester where he could point to the characters in question,
and where the child would have a clear view of the picture.
The tester began by saying,
teller you are.
picture?"

11

! want to see what a good story-

Can you tell a story about the people in this

(The tester pointed to the teacher, the two little

girls in one picture, the boy at the bottom of the slide,
the boy in the middle, and the boy gesturing at the top of
the slide.)

11

Tell \'/hat's going on, what happened before,

and how it all turns out.
thinking and feeling. 11
the child told it.

You can tell what the people are

The tester wrote down the story as

If the story was extremely meager, two or

three short sentences, the subject was encouraged to tell how
it all turned out or how the people were thinking and feeling.
When the subject had finished his initial story, the tester
read it back to make sure it was correct and to refresh the
subject's memory.
After any corrections were made and the child indicated
that the tester had the story right, the tester said,
tell the same story again.

11

Now,

Only this time make believe you
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are - - - - - - - (The tester pointed to one of the
characters, naming him.) "Tell your story like you are ____
II

11

Again, the tester transcribed the story as it was told, slowing
the subject down when necessary by repeating the words of the story.
(In fact, most of the children watched the examiner write down
the story and paced their story accordingly.)

After retelling the

story three times, once from the point of view of each of the
three characters, the subject went to another tester and repeated
the whole process for the second picture.

After telling stories

to both pictures, the subject was thanked and went to take the
Empathy Questionnaire, returned to the classroom, or went home.
Later, the stories were transcribed onto standard forms
for scoring (see Appendix A).
Though this too varied, the Empathy Questionnaire was
most often given to children in groups of four.

The children were

seated in front of the television monitor, and the tester said:
We are interested in finding out what children see when
watching TV programs. I have some programs of people
doing different things. Please watch closely. I will
be asking you some questions as we watch. I'll want
you to circle on·your papers how certain people are
feeling. I'll read the choices out loud to you. This
is not a test. There are no right or wrong answers.
I only want to know what YQ.!! think the reople in TV
are feeling, and what YQ.!! think may be different from
what the boy or girl sitting next to you thinks the
character is feeling. Some of these will be harder to
figure out than others. Do you understand?
The tester answered any questions, and the testing began.
The videotape was turned on, and as each crucial moment in the
tape approached, the tester said, "Mow watch - - - -

11

naming
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the character about whom the question was going to be asked.
The videotape was stopped when the crucial moment was reached,
and the tester read the question and the four choices.

After

pausing to let the children circle the answers of their choice,
the tester went on.

When the testing was over, the tester

thanked the children, and they went to take the Role Taking
Task, back to the classroom, or home.
For the Prisoner's Dilemma game, chairs were arranged in
a circle facing outward from the center.

Balloons, candy, and

gum were laid out on a table in plain view with signs underneath indicating how many points each item was worth.
children were tested in groups of six to eight.

Most

The children

were seated and told to read the instructions while the tester
finished his preparations.

The tester and his assistants

were each assigned two or three subjects.

Their job was to

explain the game or answer questions during the practice and to
write down the partner's moves on their children's forms.
They were also to pretend to write down their subjects' moves
and flash them by means of secret hand signals to one of
the other "messengers" who would write down the subject's moves.
When everything was arranged, the testers took their
places behind their subjects, on the inside of the circle, and
one of the testers read the instructions from the form (see
Appendix A), adding after the end of the second paragraph,
11

You know what cooperative means.

iJhen you cooperate with

someone, you work together to help each other get as much as
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possible.

And you know what competitive means.

When you compete,

like in sports, you try to win more than your partner.
to beat him. 11
tester said,

You try

And at the beginning of the fourth paragraph, the
11
,
~~--,--

will be messengers.

and

-~~~

, and I (naming the testers)

We will write down your moves and then

flash them to your partner's messenger who will give them to
your partner.

We will get your partner's move from his mes-

senger and write them down on your paper." This was apparently
credible, for when testing was over and the subjects were
debriefed, none of them indicated they suspected that they
had not been playing with an actual partner.
The group then went through the practice trials, with the
tester explaining the moves and the options as well as the
scoring to those children who seemed to have trouble understanding them.
When all the testers were satisfied that their subjects
understood, the testing began.

When it was over, each subject

added up his points and chose a combination of gum, candy and
balloons, the 11 cost 11 of which equalled his total points.
Balloons were 10 points, miniature Hershey bars 30 points,
gum 40 points, and bags of M &Ms 50 points.
won in the neighborhood of 100 points.

Most subjects

Subjects whose partners

had been hostile or neutral were given extra points, called
a bonus, and this was justif]ed on the grounds that they had had
a mean partner.
After all the testing was completed, the researcher
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returned to the school to explain to the children and interested
parents more about the study and to answer questions.

At

that time he explained that the Prisoner's Dilemma game had been
"rigged" to the extent that the partner's moves had been planned and there had been no actual partner.

It was explained

that this was done in order to find out how children play against
different types of partners.
to be upset.

None of the children appeared

After answering the children's questions, he

invited them and their parents to call him should there be
fu~ther

questions.

He also promised to send to the school a

brief summary of the results when the data were analyzed.

CHAPTER III
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The results in the present study were analyzed both to
test hypotheses and to explore for relationships not specifically posited in the hypotheses.

Hypotheses l through 3 concerned

the relationships among Machiavellianism, role taking and
empathy, as measured by the Kiddie Mach test, the Role Taking
Task, and the Empathy Questionnaire, respectively.

For purposes

of the initial analysis, which explored the differences in the
Prisoner's Dilemma game variables as a function of partner,
Machiavellianism, and sex, separate divisions close to the
median were used to distinguish high and low Mach boys (51.5) and
girls (50.5).

As the difference between the sexes was slight,

in the subsequent analyses, where the individual cells had
unequal frequencies, a single cutoff of 51.5 was used.

When

differences in other variables were explored as function of
role taking and empathy, cutoffs of 47.5 and 62.5 were used,
respectively, to distinguish subjects high and low on the
Role Taking Task and Empathy Questionnaire.
Hypotheses 4 through 7 concerned the relationships between
role taking and empathy and the dependent variables of the
Prisoner's Dilemma game.

Those dependent variables were Total

Score (total points won), Judgment (moves appropriate to the
matrices minus those not appropriate), SumX (cooperative moves
49
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minus competitive moves), Altruism (sum of scores on option
moves), Change (cooperative moves in the first vs. the second
half of the game), and Difference (Altruism score in the
first

v~

the second half of the game).

Hypotheses 8 through 12 concerned the relationships
between Machiavellianism, partner, and the dependent variables
of the Prisoner's Dilemma game.

The variable partner represent-

ed the different moves which the confederate made during the
option.

In Partner A, there was no option condition at all.

In Partner B, the confederate made the 11 help 11 move six times
and no move twice (the subject was therefore playing against
an altruistic partner).
the

11

In Partner C, the confederate made

zap 11 move six times and no move twice (the subject was

therefore playing against a hostile partner).

In Partner 0,

the confederate made no moves (the subject was playing against
a neutral partner).
Machiavellianism, Role Taking, and Empathy
Null Hypothesis l, that there was no significant correlation between role taking and empathy, was tested by correlating the Role Taking Task and Empathy Questionnaire
scores (see Table 2), using the Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient.
relation,

r. (78)

=

.22,

This resulted in a low positive cor-

p_L .05. Thus, Null Hypothesis l

was formally rejected; however, this low correlation accounts
for less than 5 percent of the variance, and the Role Taking
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Table 2
Correlations among Measures of Interpersonal Competence and
Variables of the Prisoner's Dilemma Game
Role
Total JudgAltruDi ff erTaking Empathy Score ment SumX ism
Change ence
Machiavellianism
Role
Taking

.08 -.26**
-.22*

Empathy
Total
Score
Judgment
SumX
Altruism
Change

.00 - . 13

.04

.07

.25*

. 16 ·-. 14

. 13

-.06

- . 12

- • 18

.02

-.02

-.06 - . 15 -.04

.l0

-.07

.67**-.15 -.31*

-.06

-.04

.00 -.29*

-.02

.09

. 17

-.11

.19

-.05

. 16

-.22

Note: Since n for Altruism and Difference-was 60, excludino
Partner A, and the n for the other variables was 80, the critical
values required to establish statistical significance were
different for different correlations.
*£ L .05 (two-tailed)
**Q L .01 (two-tailed)
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Task and Empathy Questionnaire can be interpreted, for practical
purposes, as unrelated.

This result and interpretation is

compatible with the findings of Kurdek and Rodgon (1975) and
Moir (1974) which showed measures of role taking and

~mpat~y

to

be uncorrelated more often than they were correlated in different samples and with different measures of the constructs.
To test Hypothesis 2, that high Machs score higher on
the Role Taking Task than low Machs, high and low Machs were
compared with regard to their performance on the Role Taking
Task.

The differences, as shown in Table 4, were not statistical-

ly significant,£. (1, 76) = .25.

The finding of a nonsignifi-

cant correlation is compatible with this result as indicated
by Table 2.

(See Table 3 for the relevant means.)

The reasoning underlying Hypothesis 2 was not based on
experimental findings.

As high Machs are cognitively oriented

(Geis & Christie, 1970) and are said to be more competent
socially (Weinstein, 1969), they might be expected to be
superior to low Machs at role taking, which is the ability to
urderstand what the other knows.

The failure to find confirmation

for Hypothesis 2 might be accounted for

bn

two grounds:

First,

high Machs do not excel in cognitive ability (high and low
Machs do not differ in intelligence, for example) but rather
in their ability to stay focused on the task at hand in the
presence of distractions, which low Machs tend to involve
themselves in emotionally (Geis et al. 1970).

Second, performance

53

Table 3
Means and Standard Deviations for the Role Taking Task in
Relation to Different Levels of Machiavellianism and Empathy

Machiavellianism
High

Low

Total

SD

16
48.25
5.37

27
48.63
4.32

43
48.89
4.68

n
M
SD

22
47 .14
4.66

15
45.60
3.81

37
46.51
4.35

n

38
47.61
4.93

42
47.55
4.31

80
47.57
4.61

Empathy
n

High

Low

Total

M

M

SD
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Table 4
Analysis of Variance for the Role Taking Task in Relation to
Different Levels of Machiavellianism and Empathy
Source

df

MS

F

L 1.00

Machiavellianism (M)

l

5. 16

Empathy (E)

1

82.65

3.98*

MX E

l

17.35

1.61

Error

76

20.78

*p_ L . 05
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on the Role Taking Task involves an understanding of the other's
feelings as one aspect of achieving a high score; it is not
exclusively a measure of understanding another's cognitions.
To test Hypothesis 3, that low Machs score higher on
Empathy than high Machs, high and low Machs were compared with
regard to their performance on the Empathy Questionnaire.
The hypothesis was supported:

Low Machs scored higher on the

Empathy Questionnaire (!1 = 63.60) than high Machs (!1 = 60.92).
(See Table 5).

As table 6 indicates, this difference was

statistically significant, f_ (1, 76)

= 6.37, P...L .05. The

low, but significant correlation between Machiavellianism and
empathy (Table 2) was consistent with this, r (78)
£

= -.26,

L .os.
The evidence that low Machs were better at understanding

the emotions of others might be understood in relation to findings
that low Machs have a more elaborate system of concepts for
understanding others than high Machs (Delia &O'Keefe, 1976).
Subjects with a more differentiated conceptual structure for
dealing with a given subject area might be expected to discriminate more effectively within that area.

Further, low Machs,

who are move likely to become involved with people and are
oriented to emotions (Geis &Christie, 1970), have a more highly
developed awareness of emotional experiences of others.
In sum, the low correlation between role taking and
empathy in the present study is consistent with the view that
they may be considered distinct abilities.

The results of the
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Table 5
Means and Standard Deviations for the Empathy -Ouestionnaire
in Relation to Different Levels of Machiavellianism and Role
Taking

Machiavellianism
Role Taking

High

Low

Total

22
64.27
4.33

43
62.86
4.44

High

n
M
SD

21
61.38
4.15

n

Low

M

17
60.35
5.58

20
62.85
5. 18

37
61.70
5.44

38
60.92
4.80

42
63.60
4.75

80
62.32
4.93

SD
n

Total

M

so
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Table 6
Analysis of Variance for Empathy Questionnaire in Relation
to Different Levels of Machiavellianism and Role Taking
Source

df

MS

F

Machiavellianism (M)

l

146.37

6.37*

Role Taking (RT)

1

30.36

l. 32

M x RT

1

• 77

Li .oo

Error

76

23.00

*£.

L .o5
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present study support the notion that low Machs have a better
understanding of the emotions of others than high Machs; however,
they seem not to differ in their ability to understand the cognitions of others.

High Machs have generally been seen as more

effective operators or manipulators.

The inference was drawn

that they were more competent interpersonally (Weinstein, 1969).
The results of the present study are compatible with the view of
Geis and Christie (1970) that high and low Machs have different
interpersonal abilities, not that one is superior.
Role Taking, Empathy, and the Prisoner s Dilemma Game
1

Hypotheses 4 through 7 investigated differences in the
variables of the Prisoner s Dilemma game in relation to levels
1

of role taking and empathy.

These hypotheses dealt with

questions which concerned role taking and empathy as predictors
of performance in the highly structured, highly simplified
interpersonal situation of the Prisoner's Dilemma game.

The

analysis used to evaluate the statistical significance of
results

be~ring

on these hypotheses was a 4 (partner) x 2 (sex)

x 2 (Machiavellianism) x 2 (role taking) x 2 (empathy) analysis
of variance for unequal

fl_.

Hypothesis 4, that subjects scoring high on the Role
Taking Task are more cooperative (score higher on SumX) than those
scoring low, was evaluated by comparing the performances of high __
and low role takers on SumX (see Table 7).

As reported in

Table 8, the difference between high role takers and low role
takers did not reach statistical significance,£.. (1, 28)

= 1.18.
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Table 7
Means and Standard Deviations of Total Score, Judgment, and
SumX on the Prisoner's Delemma Game in Relation to Partner,
Role Taking, and Empathy
Variable

n

Partner A
Role Taking Hi
Lo

11

Total Score

Judgment

M
SD

103.09
4.59
98.33
5.87

2.91
2.55
.44
3.50

13.27
5.83
19. 11
4.54

M

100.75
6.16
96. 75
7.39

1. 50
3.85
.42
2.57

18. 50
5.01
17.42
4.89

101 . 18
6.76
98.56
4.25

2.18
4.56
2.22
2.91

13.64
6.47
11.33
4.90

106.23
4.60
100.57
4.89

5.46
3.78
1.86
3.53

15.92
5.85
15.86
5.27

l 03. 12
5. 77
98.30
5.84

3.23
3.93
1.14
3.07

15. 14
6.00
16.05
5. 51

9 -M
SD

Partner B
Role Taking Hi

8

Partner C
Role Taking Hi

11

SD
Lo 12 M
SD

Lo

Partner D
Role Taking Hi
Lo

M
SD
9 M
SD

13

M

SD
7 M
SD

Role Taking
Hi

43

Lo

SD
37 M
SD

M

SumX

60
Table 7 (continued)
Partner A
Empathy Hi

12

Lo

8

Partner B
Empathy Hi

11

Lo

9

Partner C
Empathy Hi

10

Lo

10

Partner D
Empathy Hi

10

Lo

10

Hi

43

Lo

37

M

102.08
5.90
99.25
5.04

2.08
3.65
1. 38
2.50

14.58
6. 71
17.88
4.26

M

98.18
5. 13
98.56
9.21

1.00
2.49
.67
3.87

16.45
4.87
19. 56
4.46

M

102. 10
6.71
97.90
3.98

3.00
4.24
1.40
3.34

10.40
5.56
14. 80
5.39

M

104.60
4.01
103.90
6.64

2.90
4.01
5.50
3.75

16.70
6.22
15. 10
4.91

M

101.67
5.81
99.97
6.70

2.21
3.60
2.32
3.84

14.58
6.21
16.70
5.03

SD
M
SD
SD
M
SD
SD
M
SD
SD
M
SD

Empathy

SD
M
SD
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Table 8
Analysis of Variance for Unequal H_: Total Score, Judgment, and
SumX for Prisoner's Di~lemma in Relation to Role Taking, Empathy,
and Interactions

Source
Role Taking (R)
Empathy (E)
Partner (P) x R
P XE
Sex (S) X R
S X E

df

MS

(M) X R

MX E
RXE
P X S X R

P XS XE
P X MX R
P X MX E
P
S
S
S

X
X
X
X

R
M
M
R

X
X
X
X

E
R
E
E

MX R X E

P X S X MX R

P X S X MX E
P XS XR XE

Error

*Q L .o5
**QL .01

F

l 316.99 12.70**
l
21. 72 I 1.00
3 10.47 7 1.00
3 21.94/1.00
l
.01
1.00
4. 17
l 104.07

z

Machiavellianism

l
l

1.19
23.19
2.09
28.87
11.44
25.58
10.84
114.66
29.99
26.75
72.50
49.94
152.20
66.01
23.57

28

24.96

l
l
l

3
3
3
3
3
l
l
l
l

2

I
7
7
I
I
-

SumX

Judgment

Total Score

l.Oo
1.00
1.00
1.16
l.oo
1.03
l.Oo
4.59**
1.20
1.07
2.90
2.00
6.01**
2.64
L i.oo

MS

F

MS

F

62.27 4.58* 1. 18 I 1.00
1.76 L l.oo 102.34 3.65
14.48 1.07 45.04 l.60
22.17 1.63 54.68 l.95
1.02
. 01 I 1. oo 28.61
25.23
L
i.oo
1.93 L i.oo
4.26
1.22
13.16
4.45
4.64
7.12
10.21
25.59
.75
.69
.05
8.56
14.85
19.20
.02
28.08

. 31
.09
.97
.33
.34
.52
.75
1. 88
. 06
.05
.01
.63
1.09
1.41
.01

3. 78 L i. oo
23.23 I 1.00
145.75 5.26*
6.95 I l.oo
5.93/1.00
87.69 - 3.12*
13.97 I l.oo
19. 04 7 1. 00
. 38 7 1. 00
9. 75 7 1.00
13.28 7 1.00
12.54 7 l.00
7.0171.00
9.08 7 l.00
145.55 - 5.18*
13.60
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Hypothesis 5, that subjects scoring high on the Empathy
Questionnaire are more cooperative (score higher on SumX) than
those scoring low, was evaluated by comparing the performances
of those high and low on the Empathy Questionnaire on SumX (see
Table 7).

As with the Role Taking Task, the difference did

not reach statistical significance,£. (1, 28)

= 3.65

(see Table 8).

In other words, the results suggest that high scores on
the Role Taking Task and the Empathy Questionnaire are not associated with cooperativeness, as measured by the Prisoner's
Dilemma game.
The present findings are not incompatible with those of
Ceresnie (1974), Ianotti (1974), and Rushton and Weiner (1974)
which showed no significant relationship between role taking and
cooperative behavior.
This area is further complicated in the present study by a
statistically significant interaction between level of the
Role Taking Task, level of Empathy Questionnaire, and SumX,
£. (1, 28)

= 5.26, £ L .05 (see Table 8). As shown in Table 7,

the greatest difference was between high scorers on the Empathy
Questionnaire (M = 13:31) and low scorers
subjects scoring high on role taking.
Role Taking Task were intermediate;

(~

= 17.94) among

Those scoring low on the
the mean for those high on the

Empathy Questionnaire was 16.53, the mean for those low on the
Empathy Questionnaire 15.65.

In sum, the relationship between

measures of social competence and cooperation is unclear.

Some

investigations have found a positive relationship; some have
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found no relationship.

The

result~

of the present study are

consistent with studies which have found no main effect of role
taking or empathy on cooperativeness; however, there may be a
significant statistical interaction between role taking, empathy,
and cooperation.

It is impossible to decide at this point

whether the differences in results are a product of sampling
error, differences in the measures, or complex relationship
between social competence and cooperativeness.
Hypothesis 6, that subjects scoring high on the Role Taking
Task are more altruistic (score higher on Altruism) than those
scoring low, was tested by comparing the Altruism scores of
subjects scoring high on the Role Taking Task with those of
subjects scoring low. This difference was not statistically
significant, f (l, 20)

= 1.78, (see Tables 9 and 10).

Hypothesis 7, that subjects scoring high on the Empathy
Questionnaire are more altruistic (score higher on Altruism)
than those scoring low was tested in an analogous fashion.
As indicated in Table 10, this difference was also not significant, f. (1, 20) = 1.65.
A single finding in the literature (Feshbach & Feshbach,
1969) has reported a positive correlation between aggressiveness and
empathy.

However, the bulk of the evidence is consistent with

a positive correlation between role tak·ing, empathy, and altruism.
The results of the present study, if they can be said to
support any' relationship between the Role Taking Task, the
Empathy Questionnaire, and prosocial behavior measured by the
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Table 9
Means and Standard Deviations of Altruism for Role Taking,
Empathy, and Partner
Variable

Altruism
-n

M

SD

8
12

-3.13
- . 33

4.45
4. 16

11

9

-5.73
-4.67

2.45
4.39

13
7

-4.23
-3.43

3.56
2.37

Hi
Lo

32
28

--4.47
-2.50

3.52
4.23

Hi
Lo

11

-1.64
-1.22

4.37
4.68

Hi
Lo

10
10

-6.30
-4.20

1. 20
4.37

Hi
Lo

10
10

-4.60
-3.30

2.84
3.47

Hi

31
29

-4. 10

-2.97

3.68
4.22

Partner B
Role Taking Hi
Lo
Partner C
Role Taking Hi
Lo
Partner D
Role Taking Hi
Lo
Role Taking

Partner B
Empathy
Partner C
Empathy
.Partner D
Empathy

9

Empathy
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Table 10
Analysis of Variance for Unequal Ji: Altruism as a Function of
Role Taking, Empathy, and Interactions
df

MS

Role Taking ( R)

l

31. 51

l. 78

Empathy (E)

l

29.30

1.65

Partner (P)

2

4.61

L 1.00

P XE

2

4. 72

Sex (S) Role Taking

l

6.41

Li .oo
L l .oo

S XE

l

26.17

1.48

Machiave1lianism (M) X R

l

0.00

I 1.00

MX E

l

2.67

L 1.00

RXE

l

6.55

L l .oo

P XS XR

2

24.02

1.36

P XS XE

2

16.53

P X MX R

2

4.00

L 1.00
L i .oo

P X MX E

2

i.68

L 1.00

P XRXE

2

21.66
,

l. 22

S X MX R

l

.24

S X MX E

l

l.16

L 1.00
L l .oo

S XRXE

l

.01

L l .oo

MX R X E

l

1. 16

L

P X S X MX R

2

7.05

Li .oo

P X S X MX E

l

20.42

l. 15

20

17. 73

Source

Error

F

1.00
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Prisoner's Dilemma game, suggest that subjects scoring higher on
measures of social competence tend to be slightly less altruistic
and more aggressive than those scoring low on measures of
social competence.
One finding of possible importance which was not hypothesized was that subjects high on role taking score significantly
higher on Total Score and Judgment (.tl = 103.12 and 3.23,
respectively) than subjects low on role taking (11 = 98.30 and
1.14, respectively) (see Table 7).

The difference between

means of Total Score was highly significant, I (l, 28)

=

12.70, £ L .01, while the difference between the means of
Judgment was barely significant, [ (1, 28)
(see Table 8).
to empathy.

~

4.58,

£L

.05,

The same differences did not appear in relation

An inference might be made that, at least in the

context of the Prisoner's Dilemma game, subjects high on
role taking are more effective and grasp the logical structures
of the game better than subjects low on role taking.
Machiavellianism, Partner, and the Prisoner's Dilemma game
Hypotheses concerning Machiavellianism and partner were
considered together because one hypothesis involved both
variables.

The analysis used to evaluate the statistical

significance of results bearing on Hypotheses 8, 9, 10, and 12
was a 4 (partner) x 2 (sex) x 2 (Machiavellianism) analysis
of variance for equal

.!:!_.

The analysis used to evaluate the

statistical significance of results bearing on Hypotheses 10
was a 4 (partner) x 2 (sex) x 2 (Machiavellianism) analysis of
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variance for repeated measures.
Hypothesis 8, that high Machs win more points (score
higher on Total Score) than low Machs, was tested by comparing
scores of high and low Machs on Total Score.
was not statistically significant, £ (1, 64)
in Table 12.

This difference
=

.19, as shown

(See Table 11 for_the means.)

Hypothesis 9, that high Machs play more rationally (score
higher on Judgment) was tested by comparing high and low Machs
on Judgment.

As with Total Score, this result was not statis-

tically significant, f (l, 28) = .05 (see Table 12).
The results clearly support previous findings (Geis &
Christie, 1970) that high Machs are not more effective than
low Machs in situations which are not face-to-face and do not
permit manipulation.

One of the reasons for including the

option was to encourage low Machs to become distracted or involved
in the game in ways which the traditional Prisoner's Dilemma
game did not.

Under these circumstance, it was reasoned,

low Mach subjects would not focus on differences in the payoff
matrix and consequently high Machs would win, since they tend to
remain objective.

Evidently, the modifications of the Prisoner's

Dilemma game used in the present study did not alter it significantly from that point of view.
Hypothesis 10, high Machs become more competitive (score lower on Change in the second half) in the course of the game, was
tested by examing the Change scores of high Machs (see Table 13).
This difference was not statistically significant, f (l, 16) = .38
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Table 11
Means and Standard Deviations for Total Score,
SumX in Relation to Partner and Mach
Variable
Partner A
Mach Hi
Lo
Total
Partner B
Mach .Hi
Lo
Total
Partner C
Mach Hi
Lo
Total
Partner D
Mach Hi

Judgment

SumX

102.75
5.01
99.75
5.88
100.95
5.61

3.25
3.45
.83
2. 72
1.80
3. 19

15.50
7.07
16. 17
5.41
15.90
5.96

M
SD

98.30
7.57
98.40
6.88
98.35
7.04

.80
3.49
.90
2.85
.:85
3. 10

18.60
5.58
17 .10
4. 12
. 17 .85
4.84

M
SD

99.00
6. 31
101.00
5.35
100.00
5.79

1.80
2.74
2.60
4. 77
2.20
3.81

11. 80
6.96
13.40
4.58
12.60
5.79

M
SD

103. 10
5.55
105.40
5. 17
104.25
5.35

3.80
3.49
4.60
4.,62
4.20
4.01

16.00
6. 31
15.80
4.94
15.90
5. 51

M
SD

100.68
6.38
101.07
6.22

2.37
3.39
2. 17
3.98

15.47
6.70
15.64
4.83

M

SD
8 M
SD
20 M
SD
10

10 M
SD
20 M
SD
10

10 M
SD
20 M
SD
10

Lo

10 M
SD
20 M
SD

Hi

40

Lo

40 M
SD

Total

and

Total Score

n

-

12

Judgment~

Mach
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Table 12
Analysis of Variance for Equal N: Total Score, Judgment, and
SumX in relation to Partner, Sex and Machiavellianism

df

MS

F

Partner (P)

3

123.58

Sex (S)

l

49.61

Mach (M)

l

6. 61

xs

3

64. 05

P XM

3

20. 65 L

S XM

l

2.81

i.oo
L l.oo

P X S XM

3

40. 71

1.14

64

35. 72

p

Error
*£ L .o5
**£.L .01

L

Su;nX

Judgement

Total Score

MS

F

MS

3.46* 139.78

3.00* 94.91

1,38

25.31

1.90

i. oo

i.oo
10.85 L i.oo
3. 61 L i. oo
.61 L l.oo
12.08 L l.oo

80.49

13. 28

30.84

1. 79

.61 L

F

3.07*

9.11 L i. oo
. 61 L l. oo
19.98 L i.oo
a. 9s L 1. oo
21.01 L i.oo
2.60
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Table 13
Means and Standard Deviations for Variables of Change and
Difference for the Prisoner's Dilemma Game
Difference

Change

Partner A
Mach Hi
Lo

M
SD

M

SD

M

Total

SD

Partner B
Mach Hi
Lo

M
SD

M

SD

M

Total

SD

Partner C
Mach Hi
Lo

M
SD

M

SD

M

Total

SD

Partner D
Mach Hi
Lo

M

SD
M
SD

Total
Mach

M
SD

Hi
Lo

M
SD

M

SD

First
Half

Second
Half

First
Half

7.88
3.23
8.67
3. 14
8.35
3.12

7.63
4.17
7.50
3.29
7.55
3.56

9.60
2. 12
8.40
2.41
9.00
2.29

9.00
4.55
8.70
2.87
8.85
3.70

-1.30
2.67
-0.80
2.78
-1.05
-2.67

-0.70
2. 16
0.00
2.05
- . 35
2.08

6.50
3.47
7 .10
2.'88
6.80
3. 12

5.30
3.95
6.30
2.98
5.80
3.44

-3.20
1.14
-2.50
1. 18
-2.85
1.18

-2.80
1.87
-2.90
· l. 29
-2.85
l. 57

9.20
3.39
8.80
3.22
9.00
3.23

6.80
3.05
7.00
2.62
6.90
2. 77

-2.40
1.58
-1.70
1. 77
-2.05
1. 67

-2.50
l. 35
-1.90
l.37
-2.20
1.36

8.32
3.22
8.26
2.91

7. 16
4.04
7.38
2.99

-2.30
2.00
-1.67
2.07

-2.00
2.00
-1.60
1.98

Second
Half
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(see Table 14).

This does not support the finding of Christie

et al. (1970) that in the Prisoner's Dilemma game, high Machs
become significantly more competitive over time.

This may be due

to the fact that, in the present study, the game was run for
relatively few trials.
Hypothesis 11, high Machs play more aggressively (score
lower on Altruism) than low Machs, was tested by comparing the
Altruism scores of high and low Machs.

This difference did not

reach statistical significance,£. {l, 48) = 1.92, as indicated
in Table 16.

The study of Hahlin reviewed in Christie et al.

(1970), thus, was not supported.
Hypothesis 12, that subjects playing against an aggressive
partner (Partner C) are more aggressive (score lower on Altruism)
than those playing against other partners (Partners B and D),
was tested by examining the effects of Partner on Altruism.
Subjects playing against Partner C did score lower (!:! = -5.25)
than those playing against Partner B (t!_ = -1.45) or Partner D
(M

=

-3.95) (see Table 15).

The main effect of Partner was

highly significant,£. (2, 40) = 5.45, £ [ . . 01 {see Table 16).
The individual means were compared using the Newman-Keuls
procedure and those values were evaluated against Duncan's
critical values.

The difference between the Partner C condition

and the Partner B condition (the altruistic partner) was
statistically significant.

The difference between Partner C

and Partner D (the neutral partner) was not (see Table 17).
These results lend partial support to Berkowitz' (1974) finding
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Table 14
Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance for Change and Difference
Change

Difference

df

MS

F

Partner

3

2.53

Sex

1

Mach

df

MS

F

L l .oo

2

l.17

Li .oo

.35

L l .oo

l

1.80

1.38

1

1. 96

L l .oo

1

.06

Partner X Sex

3

9.39

1.83

2

.27

L 1.00
L i .oo

Partner X Mach

3

4 .13

L 1.00

2

1.03

L l .oo

Sex X Mach

1

6. 72

l. 31

l

1. 70

1. 30

16

5. 13

12

1. 30

Error
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Table 15
Means and Standard Deviations for Altruism in Relation to
Partner, Sex and Machiavellianism
Independent Variable

-n

M

SD

Grand Total

60

-3.55

3.96

Partner B

20

-1.45

4.39

c

20

-5.25

3.40

D

20

-3.95

3. 15

Male

30

-4.33

3.62

Female

30

-2. 77

4.18

Mach Hi

30

-4.20

3.92

Lo

30

-2.90

3.96

74

Table 16
Analysis of Variance for Equal N: Altruism in Relation to
Partner, Sex, and MachiavellianTsm
df

MS

Partner (P)

2

74.60

5.45**

Sex (S)

l

36.82

2.69

Mach (M)

1

25.35

1. 92

xs

2

22.87

1.67

P XM

2

.60

S XM

1

8.82

L 1.00
L l .oo

P XS XM

2

.87

L l .oo

48

13. 67

p

Error
*.e_ L .o5
**.e_ L .01

F
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Table 17
Individual Comparisons among Means for Different Levels of
Partner Using the Newman-Keuls Procedure Evaluated Against
Duncan's Critical Values

Dependent
Variable
Total Score

Judgment

SumX

Comparison

R

df

B- D

4

64

4.42**

c-

D

3

64

3.18*

B- A

3

64

l. 95

D- B

4

64

4.12**

A- D

4

64

2.95

B- C

4

64

4.23**

c

3

64

2.66

B- C

3

48

4.60**

B- D

2

48

3.02*

D- C

2

48

2.06

D-

Altruism

*£. L .os
**£. L .01

.9.
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that aggressiveness in others leads to aggressiveness.
The difference between the Partner B and Partner D
conditions was also significant, as indicated in Table 17.
This suggests an extension of Berkowitz' notions:

subjects

tend to respond in kind to other people regarding altruistic
and aggressive behavior.
Partner was the most consistently significant variable in
the present study.

In addition to Altruism, Total Score,

Judgment, and SumX were significantly affected by Partner.
(see Tables 11 and 12).
(3, 64)

=

Specificaily, for Total Score,

3.46, Q L .05, for Judgment,

p_[ .05, and for SumX,

£..

(3, 64)

£..

= 3.07,

..E.

(3, 64) = 3.00,
p_[ .05.

As indicated

by the Neuman Keuls test, reported in Table 17, Total Score
subjects in the Partner D condition scored significantly higher

(M = 104.25)

than those in the Partner B condition (M = 98.35),

and they scored significantly higher than those in the Partner C
condition (M

=

100.00), but Partner

differ significantly from Partner B.

A(~=

100.95) did not

For Judgment, Partner D

(M = 4.20) was significantly higher than Partner B (M
but not significantly higher than Partner A (M

=

.85),

= 1.80). The

points accumulated or lost as a result of the option moves
was not considered in Total Score, Judgment, or SumX.

One

interpretation of these findings is that playing against either
a benevolent or antagonistic partner tends to distract the subject
from performing with maximum effectiveness on the task at hand
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while playing against a neutral partner in a game with an
option enhances effectiveness.

It may be that having a benevo-

lent partner is a further deterrent to effective play perhaps
because the subject is not moved to play actively.
Not surprisingly, subjects playing against an altruistic
partner were most cooperative
against hostile partner

(~

(~

= 17.85) and those playing

= 12.60) were least cooperative.

This difference was significant, as indicated in Table 17.
The absence of a significant correlation between cooperativeness
and altruism, as indicated in Table 2, suggests that those behaviors
are not related empirically and that 11 prosocial 11 is not an
appropriate category to subsume them under.
Finally, it should be mentioned that sex was not significant
as an independent variable with regard to any of the other
variables and that no significant differences were found in Change
and Difference.
The results of the present study ::an be sumnarized as
follows:

the treatment variable partner was the most consistently

significant of the independent variables, having a significant
effect on a11 but the change va ri ab 1es in the Pri saner':.; Oil emma
game.

With regard to affecting prosocial and asocial responses,

the partner's behavior style elicited similar responses in the
subjects.

With regard to

effectiveness~

the neutral partner

elicited with the most effective performance and the benign
partner elicited the least effective performance.
lianism was related to empathy but not role taking.

Machiavel-
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High Machs scored lower on the Empathy Questionnaire than low
Machs.

The Role Taking Task and Empathy Questionnaire showed

a low positive correlation.

Role Taking was the only one of the

subject variables which was significantly related, as a main
effect, to any of the Prisoner's Dilemma game variables.
Subjects high on the Role Taking Task were more effective
players, as indicated by Total Score.

CHAPTER IV
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
To predict a subject s
1

performan~e

in the present study,

it was more important to know hml/ his partner played than to
know his scores on measures of social competence.

Indeed,

the only inference which could be drawn legitimately from
a subject s scores on measures of social competence was that if
1

he scored high on the Role Taking Task, he was likely to win
more points and understand the payoff matrix better than if he
scored low.

In contrast, if a subject played a neutral partner,

he was likely to win more points and understand the payoff
matrix better than if he played an altruistic or an aggressive
partner; and if a subject played an altruistic partner, he was
likely to play more altruistically and more cooperatively
than if he played an aggressive partner.

It is, of course,

an empirical question whether these results generalize to other
samples, populations, measures of interpersonal competence,
and interpersonal situations.
The Kiddie Mach test, the Role Taking Task, and the Empathy
Questionnaire, which measured the subconstructs of interpersonal
competence in the present study, showed low correlations.

The

Kiddie Mach test and the Empathy Questionnaire had a low negative
correlation; the Role Taking Task and the Empathy Questionnaire
had a low positive correlation; and the Role Taking Task and
79
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the Kiddie Mach test had a nonsignificant correlation.

These

findings are consonant with results of previous studies:

if

the construct "social competence

11

11

or social intell igence
11

,

,

is valid, then the tests purporting to measure that construct
do not measure it accurately.

The patterns of correlations

among those tests and tests of related constructs, such as
11

abstract intelligence

11
,

shm-J neither appropriate convergent

nor discriminant validity for the construct.
A major limitation of the present study was that interpersonal behavior was studied in a minimal interpersonal
situation, the Prisoner's Dilemma game in which there were either
two or five possible responses to the same responses of an unknown
and unseen partner.

Further, prosocial and asocial behavior

were operationalized so they were mutually exclusive.

In the

present study, hostile aggression was not distinguished from
instrumental aggression; nor was the analogous distinction
made with regard to altruism, cooperation, and competition.
In other words, further studies might profitably use measures
of interpersonal behavior and interpersonal situations which
bear a closer resemblance to actual social situations than
did the measures in the present study.
One possible explanation for the finding that measures
of social competence have little to do with interpersonal
behavior is that these measures actually have little predictive
value relative to actual behavior.

Another is that the measures

used in the present study are not appropriate.

Empathy is
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not required in the Prisoner's Dilemma game, and there is
little room for an interpersonal manipulator to operate.
Perhaps the Role Taking Task is related to performance on
the Prisoner's Dilemma game because it involves maintaining
logical consistency among a number of story elements, and the
game also involves an understanding of the relationships
among a limited number of elements.

Perhaps intelligence

and level of motivation would be predictive of performance
in this game because the subject had to understnad the game
and attend despite its repetitiveness.

A third explanation

might be that a division approximating a median split was
used to distinguish subjects high and low on measures of
social competence while the different partners' response
patterns were quite distinct.

Perhaps three or four levels

on each variable would reveal differences between the extremes
which related to the Prisoner's Dilemma game.
In conclusion, the overlapping concepts and complicated
measures in the area of social competence have produced more
confusion than clarity.

It is to be hoped that further studies

will be designed to gather information on a variety of measures
of social competence so that multitrait-multimethod validation
procedures may be used to tease out meaningful constructs in that
area.
Thorndike, in his definition of social intelligence (1920),
included both an understanding of an appropriate behavior in
social relationships.

Walker and Foley (1973) have emphasized
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that an understanding of social relationships, as measured by
tests of social cognition or social intelligence, has not been
shown empirically to be related to appropriate social behavior.
The present study, which has included a measure of Machiavel1ianism among measures of social competence, tend to underline
the suspicion that the two may not be closely related.

SUMMARY
A Machiavellian orientation to interpersonal relations
and perspective-taking ability are frequently mentioned as
prerequisites for effective social interaction.

The present

study investigated the relationship between those personality
variables, partner's response, and the interpersonal behaviors
of altruism, aggression, cooperation, and competition.

In the

present study, Machiavellianism was measured by the Kiddie Mach
test and perspective-taking ability by the Role Taking Task and
the Empathy Questionnaire.

The interpersonal behaviors were

measured by a modified Prisoner's Dilemma game.

The game was

modified by (a) introducing an option in some conditions
which permitted the subject to make an aggressive or an altruistic
move, and (b) changing the payoff matrix in half the games so
that it was to the subject s advantage to play cooperatively,
1

given that his partner played cooperatively 50 percent of the time.
Scores reflected the total points won, understanding of the
game matrix, cooperativeness (vs. competitiveness), altruism
(vs. aggression), and change in altruism or cooperativeness.
Some subjects played against an altruistic partner, some against
an aggressive partner, and some against a neutral partner.
Subjects were 80 10- and 11-year-old boys and girls.
It was hypothesized that (a) the Role Taking Task and the
Empathy Questionnaire are not significantly correlated, (b)
83
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high Machs score significantly higher on the Role Taking Task
than low Machs, and (c) low Machs score significantly higher
on the Empathy Questionnaire than high Machs.

The Role Taking

Task and the Empathy Questionnaire showed a significant positive
correlation; high Machs did not score significantly higher on
the Role Taking Task than low Machs, however, low Machs scored
significantly higher on the Empathy Questionnaire than high
Machs.

Further, it was hypothesized that (d) subjects scoring

high on the Role Taking Task or the Empathy Questionnaire
are significantly more cooperative than those scoring low,
and (e) subjects scoring high on the Role Taking Task or the
Empathy Questionnaire are significantly more altruistic than
those scoring low.

Neither hypothesis was supported.

Finally,

it was hypothesized that (f) high Machs win significantly
more points and play significantly more rationally than low
Machs, (g) high Machs become significantly more competitive
in the course of the game, (h) high Machs play significantly
more aggressively than low Machs, and (i) subject playing
against an aggressive partner play more aggressively than
those playing against other partners.
received even partial support:

Only the last hypothesis

subjects playing against an

aggressive partner were significantly more aggressive than
those playing against an altruistic partner, but they were not
significantly more aggressive than playing aqainst a neutral
partner.
There were two significant findings which had not been

85

hypothesized:

{a) subjects scoring high on the Role Taking

Task won significantly more points and showed significantly a
better understanding of the payoff matrix than those scoring low,
and (b) subjects won significantly more points when playing
against a neutral partner than when playing against either
an altruistic or an aggressive partner.
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I.

PARENTAL CONSENT FORM

The following letter was somewhat modified because this
researcher's study overlapped that of a fellow graduate student
and a form was devised to include both studies. Also, specific
times and dates were included, depending on the school.
Dear Parents:
I am a Ph.D. candidate in psychology at Loyola University
of Chicago. My dissertation research concerns the relationship between children's interpersonal orientations and their
behavior in a game situation. It would be most helpful if you
would allow your son/daughter
to participate in the study.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-

First, your child will fill out a short questionnaire
concerning his interpersonal orientation. He will then perform
tasks measuring his role-taking and empathetic skills. Finally,
he will play the game. In the game, he will have two possible
moves, and the number of points he wins will aepend both on the
moves he makes and the move his partner makes. At certain points
in the game, he may have the option of giving his partner points
or taking them away from his. His partner will have the same
option. At the end of the game, children will be able to buy
candy and gum with their points.
I expect your child to enjoy the tasks, but if at any time
he decides not to continue, he will be free to do so. You
yourself are welcome to ask questions and see the testing
materials before, during, or after the testing. Please call me
at home at 274-4192. Evenings are best. After the testing is
completed, I will come to the school to explain the tests and
the study to the children and interested parents.
Besides being enjoyable, I believe this study will provide
a useful experience for your child in contrast to so many testing
experiences. In this one he will be able to relax, enjoy the
tasks, and talk to the tester when testing is over.
The results of the tests are entirely confidential. Your
child will be assigned a number, and the results of his tests
will be analyzed statistically, along with those of the other
children.
If your child is to participate, I will need a little
background information. Please give the occupation of the
head of the household (job title and job description) and years
of education of the head of the household.
Respectfully,
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Please sign and return the following to school.

I give my permission for my child
participate in Mr. Bryant's study.

Occupation of head of household

~~~~~~~~~~~~~

to

~~~~·~~~~~~~~~~~

Years of education of head of household

~~~~~~~~~~~~
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II.

Empathy Questionnaire.

The Brady
1)

How does Mrs.
a)

2)

upset

Br~

b)

feel after her second fall?

sore

discouraged

d)

frustrated

sorry

b)

embarassed

c)

funny

d)

hassled

How does Marcia feel when she says "Smarty"?
a)

sad

b)

angry

The Andy Griffith Show:
4)

c)

How does Mr. Brady feel after he has fallen?
a)

3)

Mr. &Mrs. Brady switch jobs for a day.

Bunc~:

c)

insulted

d)

"stuck-up"

Helen Krump, Andy's girlfriend is
the director of a school play.

How does Andy feel when Helen says, "Who else would
pitch in without being asked?"
a)

5)

b)

angry

c)

surprised

d)

helpful

How does Andy feel after Goober's imitation of Cary Grant?
a)

6)

tricked

tired

b)

angry

c)

uninterested

d)

bored

How does Helen feel when she says, "We did want it to
be a surprise"?
a)

Serpico:

7)

b)

worried

shocked

c)

pleased

d)

"on the
spot"

Serpico, an undercover policeman, pretends to be
an M-16 rifle salesman selling guns to black
gangsters.

How is the black man feeling when he tells Serpico to
"put his whole life into his story"?
a)

angry

b)

worried

c)

manacing

d)

hateful
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8)

How does Serpico feel when he is told that he got off
at the wrong stop on the subway?
a)

9)

scared

b)

upset

c)

overpowered

d)

sad

How does Serpico feel when the black boss tells his
men to "Let him go"?
a)

10)

happy

b)

satisfied

c)

brave

d)

relieved

How does the black boss feel at the end as his assistant
smiles?
a)

clever

b)

good

The Bob Newhart Show:
11)

pleased

d)

worried

Bob and Emily are visited by Bob s
mother.
1

How is Emily feeling when she says, "Could you help?
a)

12)

c)

unhappy

b)

tired

c)

aggravated

d)

11

disgusted

How is Emily feeling when she asks, "Does the place
look all right?"
a)

13)

b)

nervous

scared

c)

calm

d) worried

How does Bob feel when he says, "My mother and father
are separated."?
a)

Kojak:
14)

b)

shocked

insulted

c)

confused

d)

unhappy

Joseph Arrow, a young Indian living in New York
has a hot temper.

How does the old man feel when he says to Joseph,
the hell are you?"
a)

angry

b)

scared

c)

curious

d)

shocked

11

Who
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15)

How is

~oseph

feeling when he says, "It was really

ridiculous."?
a)
16)

desperate

b)

insulted

c)

unhappy

d)

angry

How is Joseph feeling when he says, "I just came for my
job back."?
a)

17)

b)

stupid

scared

c)

sorry

d)

misunderstood

What is Ben feeling when he says t_o Joseph, "Say it,
Say it!"?
a)

18)

impatient

b)

upset

c)

furious

d)

important

What is Joseph feeling when Ben tells him to, "Go sell
your feathers."?
a)

unhappy

Delvecchio:

19)

b)

insulted

c)

misunderstood

d)

rage

Police officers, Delvecchio (tall and thin) and
Chauncy (short and chubby) are on a case. Billy
is their suspect.

How is Billy feeling when Delvecchio says, "Police
Officers, Billy."?
a)

20)

scared

b)

trapped

c)

excited

d)

upset

How is Chauncy feeling when he says to Billy, "What's
the matter with you?"
b)

a)

angry

d)

impatient

worried

c)

"at the end of his rope"
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III.

Scoring Guide, Empathy Questionnaire

Question

Answer

SGore

l)

sore
upset
frustrated
discouraged

1
2
3
4

2)

funny
sorry
embarassed
hassled

l
2
3
4

3)

stuck-up
sad
angry
insulted

1

2
3
4

helpful
angry
surprised
tricked

1

5)

angry
tired
uninterested
bored

1
2
3
4

6)

pleased
worried
shocked
11
on the spot 11

4)

7)

8)

9)

2
3
4

l
2

3
4

worried
angry
hateful
menacing

1

sad
upset
overpowered
scared

1
2
3

brave
happy
satisfied
relieved

2

3
4

4

1
2
3

4

100

Question

Answer

Score
-

10)

worried
good
pleased
clever

1
2
3
4

11)

tired.
unhappy
disgusted
aggravated

1
2
3
4

12)

calm
scared
worried
nervous

l
2
3

insulted
unhappy
shocked
confused

1
2

13)

14)

15)

16)

4

3
4

curious
angry
scared
shocked

l
2
3

unhappy
angry
insulted
des pa rate

1
2
3

stupid
scared
sorry
misunderstood

4

4
1

2
3
4

important
upset
impatient
furious

4

18)

misunderstood
unhappy
insulted
rage

l
2
3
4

19)

excited
upset
scared
trapped

1
2
3
4

17)

l

2
3
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Q1:1estion
20)

Answer
worried
impatient
angry
11
at the end of his rope 11

Score
1
2
3

4
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IV.

Kiddie Mach Test.
Name:
Age:
Birthday:

lBelow are twenty statements. They are matters of opinion, and I
am interested in your opinion on each statement. You may agree
or disagree. You may agree or disagree a little or a lot) I
will read each statement aloud whild you read it to yourself. ~l··I ·~·
!To tell me your opinion, circle one of the five..E.!).t:C!~~? after vr·J' ··
the statementjl-agree a lot, agree a little, no opinion, disagree
a little, disagree a lot. Any questions?
Because(! have to have ),Our honest opinion_~ I won't tell anyone
how you filled it in. c~ou will agree with some statements and
disagree with others. Just give your first reaction. You will
have some opinion about practically every statement.)
l.

Never tell anyone why you did something unless it will
help you.
\ '
t

~

l

.

agree a lot agree a little no opinion disagree a little
disagree a lot
2.

Most people are good and kind.

'

agree a lot agree a little no opinion disagree a little
disagree a lot
3.

The best way to get a 1ong with people is to te 11 them
things that will make them happy.

agree a lot .£.gree a little no opinion disagree a little
disagree a lot
4.

You should do something only when you are sure it is right.

agree a lot agree a little no opinion disagree a little
disagree a lot
5.

It is smartest to believe that all people will be mean if
they have a chance.

agree a lot agree a little ~inion disagree a little
disagree a lot

;, I '

:

,-~·
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6.

You should always be honest, no matter what.

agree a lot agree a little no opinion disagree a little
disagree a lot
7.

Sometimes you have to hurt other people to get what J'
you want.

~

agree a lot agree a little no opinion disagree a little
disagree a lot
8.

Most people won t work hard unless you make them do it.
1

agree a lot agree a little no opinion disagree a little
disagree a lot
9.

It is better to be ordinary and honest than famous and L ',
dishonest.

agree a lot agree a little no opinion disagree a little
disagree a lot
10.

It s better to tell someone why you want hime to help you ,
than to make up a good story to get him to do it.
·'
1

agree a lot agree a little no opinion disagree a little
disagree a lot
11.

Successful people are mostly honest and good.

agree a lot agree a little no opinion disagree a little
disagree a lot
12.

Anyone who completely trusts anyone else is asking for trouble.

agree a lot agree a little no opinion disagree a little
disagree a lot
13.

A criminal is just like other people except that he is
stupid enough to get caught.

agree a lot agree a little no opinion disagree a little
disagree a lot
14.

Most people are brave.

_agree a lot agree a little .!!Q.___Q_Qinion disagree a little
disagree a lot
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15.

It is smart to be nice to important people even if you
don't really 1i ke them.

I'
··l

agree a lot agree a little no opinion disagree a little
disagree a lot
16.

It is possible to be good in every way.

~

agree a lot agree a little no o~inion disagree a 1ittl e
disagree a lot
17.

Most people can not be easily fooled.

JI \

agree a lot agree a little no opinion disagree a little
disagree a lot
18.

Sometimes you have to cheat a little to get what you want.)

agree a lot agree a little no opinion disagree a little
disagree a lot
19.

It is never right to tell a lie.

agree a lot agree a little no opinion disagree a little
disagree a lot
20.

It hurts more to lose money than to lose a friend.

agree a lot agree a little no opinion disagree a 1ittl e
disagree a lot

''
'.
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V.

The X-Y Game (Prisoner s Delemma Game).
1

The form without the option (Partner-A condition) was
essentially the same, except that instructions for the option,
as well as spaces for the option moves, were omitted.
THE POINTS GAME--PRACTICE
The idea of the points game is for you to win as many points
as possible. At the end of the game you will be able to buy
things with your points. No matter what happens, you will win
points.
You have two moves in this game, X and Y. Your partner also
has two moves, X and Y. How many points you win depends on
how you play and how your partner plays. X is the cooperative
move. Y is the competitive move.
Every five p1ays, I will say 11 option. 11 When I say 11 option, 11
you can do one of three things. 1) you can help your partner
(give him 10 points, but it will cost you 2 points}. 2) You
can zap your partner (take 10 points away from your partner,
but it will cost you 2 points). 3) Do nothing. Remember,
your partner will have the same option.
You will not know who your partner is. All you will know about
him is how he makes his moves. All he will know about you is how
you make your moves. You will be getting to know him by the way
he makes his moves. He will be getting to know you in the same
way. We will not tell you who your partner is.
Game 1--points
Your points Partner's points
Your move
Partner's move
X (cooperative)
X (cooperative)
6
6
X (cooperative)
Y (competitive)
0
3
Y (competitive)
X (cooperative)
3
0
Y (competitive)
X (competitive)
l
l
Option--it costs you two points to help your partner (give him
10) or to zap him (take 10 away). It doesn't cost you anything
to do nothing.
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You make your move by writing X or Y in the space under "your move."
Someone will record your move and write it on your partner's sheet.
They will also record your partner's move and write it on your
sheet.
Your move

Partner's move

Your points

Partner's points

Your points
4

Partner's points

l.

2.
3.
4.
5.
Option
Game 2--points
Your move
Partner's move

x
x
y
y

x
y
x
y

Option (same as above)
1.

2.
3.

4.
5.
Option

0
5
l

4

5
0
1
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Name- - Game 1--points
Your move

x
x
y
y

Option:

Your move
1.

2.
3.
4.
5. - - - Option
6. - - - 7. - - - 8. - - - 9. - - - 10. - - - Option

Partner's move

x
y
x
y

Your points

Partner's points

6

6

0

3
0
l

3
l

Help (H) gives your partner 10, costs you 2.
Zap (Z) takes away 10 from your partner, costs you 2.
Nothing
Partner's move

Your points

Partner's points
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Game 2--points
Your move

x
x

y
y

Partner's move

x

y

x

y

Your points

Partner's points

4

5

4
5
0

l

l

0

Option: Help (H) gives your partner 10, costs you 2.
Zap (Z) takes away 10 from your partner.
Nothing
Your move
l.

2.
3.

4.
5.
Option
6.
7.
8.
9.
10. - - - Option

Partner's move

Your points

Partner's points
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Game 1--points
Your move

x
x
y
y

Option:

Your move
1.

2.
3.
4.
5.
Option
6. - - - 7.
8.
9.
10. - - - Option

Partner's move

x
y
x
y

Your points

Partner's points

6
0
3
1

6
3
0

l

Help {H) gives your partner 10, costs you 2.
Zap {Z) takes away 10 from your partner, costs you 2.
Nothing
Partner's move

Your points

Partner's points
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Name
Game 2--points
Your move

x
x
y

y

Option:

Your move
1.

----

2.
3.
4.
5. - - - Option
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
Option

~---

Partner's move

x
y
x
y

Your points
4

Partner's points
4

0

5

5
l

0
l

Help (H) gives your partner 10, costs you 2.
Zap (Z) takes away 10 from your partner.
Nothing
Partner's move

Your points

Partner's points
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